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INTRODUCTION

To many historians a philosophy
rather than a useful system of thought.
tend that knowledge concerning

of history is an object of inquiry

Today

T

s social scientists do

man can be systematized

leap from the specific to the general is too great.
gist

—

the epitome of the social scientist

from his specific laboratory

findings.

—

into a philosophy.

The

The physiological psycholo-

shows great reluctance

Many

not pre-

to generalize

historians, also imagining them-

selves to be social scientists, have conjured up a host of reasons to avoid generalization.

One victim

of this trend has been the respectability of "philosophy of

history," with the grandiose statements implied by "philosophy."
this subject

has written that the "ordinary professional historian

practicing positivist.

it,

If

is

A

student of

usually a

he has a philosophy of history, he feels uneasy about

particularly in the presence of his colleagues."

*

At the same time that philosophies of history are denied, "meaning"
history

—

if

considered at

all

—

is

concentrated upon particular events or time

periods, rather than applied to the whole of history.

Meyerhoff has pointed out,

1 E.

2

2 there

However, as Hans

has been, in the last thirty or forty years,

Harris Harbison, Christianity and History (Princeton, 1964),

Hans Meyerhoff, ed. The Philosophy
(New York, 1959), pp. 21-24.
,

in

of History in

p. 45.

Our Time: An Anthology

2

a renewal of interest

among

theologians in the "meaning" in (and

of)

history.

This concern with meaning, in the sense that a philosophy of history

is

has not generally been accepted by historians.

in

Herbert Butterfield,

Christianity and History, ° stands as an exception.

among

As

implied,

a result of the failure

historians to concern themselves with the overall meaning and philo-

sophical implications of their subject, the discussion of philosophy of history

has been centered primarily among philosophers

from

—

who usually approach history

the presuppositions of philosophical idealism, or naturalism

—

and theo-

logians.

The theologians

of the last forty years

whose interest

in history

has

resulted in significant contributions to the problem of meaning in history include

Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, Jacques Maritain, Anders Nygren,
Friedrich Gogarten, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr*

The philosopher -theologian Karl Lowith has also made a heavy contribution
this field.

to

5

Of these writers, and many others, Reinhold Niebuhr has had the greatest impact in America.

3

Niebuhr, whose first article appeared in 1916, has

Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York, 1949).

4 For the background of this

and History

Word

movement see E. Harris Harbison, Christianity
and James M. Connolly, Human History and the

chapter two;
of God: The Christian
,

Me a ning

of History in

Contemporary Thought

(New York, 1965).
5

Karl Lowith's most widely known work

is

Meaning

in History (Chicago,

1949).

4

3

demonstrated over the past
history.

His theology

fifty

years an intense interest

is unintelligible without a

meaning

in the

of

consideration of his philosophy

of history; neither can his philosophy of history be intelligently discussed with-

out an understanding of his theology.

This

is

not an exceptional fact:

interest of theologians in history has prompted the use of the
of history" in place of "philosophy of history. "

nology, the subject-matter remains the same.

the

term "theology

In spite of the differing

The difference

termi-

is that

theological rather than idealistic or naturalistic presuppositions are used in
the formation of a philosophy of history.

We

will not

ogy, except as

it

need

to

concern ourselves extensively with Niebuhr

relates to his philosophy of history.

comprehensive examination

Nor

of his philosophy of history.

The work

that has previously

show the development

a

The former problem
is

beyond the

been done on Niebuhr

philosophy of history has tended to view the subject as a whole;
of this paper to

s theol-

we attempt

shall

has been adequately treated by several scholars, 6 and the latter
scope of this paper.

T

it is

T

s

the purpose

of Niebuhr s thinking on history up to the
T

publication in 1937 of his first major book on philosophy of history, Beyond

Tragedy:

Essays on the Christian Interpretation

of History

Tragedy, many of the ideas which he had presented

in

.

'

In

Beyond

more random

fashion

over the past fifteen years were brought together and systematically elaborated
6 Two excellent studies ace

Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr
trans, by Louise Pettibone Smith (New York, 1956), and Gordon Harland,
The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1960).

^Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy:
History (New York, 1937).

Essays on

,

the Christian Interpretation of

u

"sermonic essays.

in fifteen

Edinburgh in the spring and

The Nature and Destiny

Niebuhr delivered the Gifford Lectures

fall of 1939,

The second volume, Human Destiny
presentation of Niebuhr

T

s

1

interpretation of history is

The

Self

8

and 1943.

And

the

most comprehensive

philosophy of history was published in

A Comparison

One further volume which

.

s

in 1941

,

especially important as a systematic

philosophy of history.

1949 as Fa ith and History:
9

is

,

and systematic statement of Niebuhr

History

and published them in two volumes as

Man: A Christian Interpretation

of

in

of Christian

and Modern Views of

is especially significant for

and the Dramas of History

Niebuhr's

published in

,

1955.

These important works, beginning with Beyond Tragedy
for

most analyses

of Niebuhr s philosophy of history.
T

,

form

the basis

What does not seem

to

be

equally understood is the fact that Niebuhr s philosophy of history did not sud1

denly emerge in Beyond Tragedy (or in

over a dozen years of development.

Human

Destiny

An analysis

of

)

but was the product of

Niebuhr

T

s publications

up

to

1937 provides evidence for the hypothesis that the formation of the basic ideas
in

Niebuhr

1

s vision of history took place well

before their systematic presenta-

tion as a philosophy of history.

8

Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretatio n
New York, 1941 and 1943). The edition cited in this paper is that of
(2 vols.
1964, and the volumes will hereafter be referred to as Human Nature (vol. 1)
and Human Destiny (vol. 2).
;

9

Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern
Views (New York, 1949). Cf. Nathan Scott, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr
(Minneapolis, 1963), p. 38.

5

II

THE

It

becomes apparent,

Niebuhr s writing
T

is

more

1920 S
T

after

(PART

some

1)

study, that what is essential in

convincingly put forth in his books than in his

Nevertheless, we do find occasional shorter pieces which express

articles.

an argument in such a way that the less concentrated presentation in the longer

works

is illuminated.

importance of the articles,

In addition to this initial

they are also valuable in

some cases

for showing a development of ideas in

Niebuhr's philosophy of history.

1^

Between 1915 and 1928, Niebuhr served as pastor for a rapidly growing

From

church in the automotive boom-town of Detroit.
the Union Theological Seminary,

It

is

easy

but

where he has remained for the rest

to attribute to his early publications

We

ence of his later thought.

Detroit he took a post at
of his life.

from Detroit a presci-

can trace the earlier, more amorphous thinking

we must guard against reading conclusions

of the 1930 s back into the
T

tentative statements of the 1920 s.
T

Though we are aware
later thought which clearly

10

Cf

.

Georgette Vignaux,

(Paris, 1956), p. 7.

of this danger, there are several

emerge

in certain of

La Theologie

Niebuhr

T

s

elements of the

early articles in

de THistoire chez Reinhold Niebu hr

.

The Christian Century and The

Atlantic Monthly

As early as 1922,

.

example, Niebuhr spoke of the "sin of modern society.

M

11

Though

for
in this

case he meant that the economic struggle was unfairly conducted, the fact that

he applied the word "sin"

upon original
theology

man.

1

(in

sin,

and

to society as a

whole anticipates his later emphasis

is indicative of the entire

which Niebuhr was

Neo-Orthodox movement

in the foreground)

in

which stressed the sin of

9

There are two further points

in this early article,

from 1922, which

point to elements in Niebuhr s mature thought closely connected to his philoso1

phy of history.
conflict. 13

it is

The

first is his reference to the "inevitability" of

economic

much

not the fact of economic conflict that is significant so

as the use of the word "inevitability. " This word is generally employed by

one who has accepted the existence of at least one absolute.
relativist

would hesitate

to call

A

thorough-going

any future event inevitable, because he would

have presupposed no "given" by which he could judge the course of history.

Throughout

fifty

years of writing, Niebuhr has had no compunctions about

designating an event "inevitable."
conflict" as inevitable (as did

n "The

many

The

fact that, in 1922, he

saw "economic

people) should not permit us to forget that

Church and the Middle Class," The Christian Century

,

39 (Dec. 7, 1922),

1514.
12

Karl Barth, who initiated much of the thinking of Neo -Ortho doxy, published his
seminal work, The Epistle to the Romans in 1918. Though Niebuhr was among
the first Americans to recognize this essentially European movement, there is
no evidence to suggest his awareness before the middle or late 1920 s.
,

f

13 "The Church and the Middle Class,

" o£_.

cit_.

7

but a short step from interpreting a force in history as inevitable, to

it is

calling the course of history inevitable

The second
article of the

point,

—

as he was later to do.*^

perhaps a semantic one,

is

Niebuhr

!

s

use in this

words "prophetic" and "prophet." He referred not only

view of the economic situation as necessarily "prophetic," but also
Either we

role as that of a "prophet. "
of a

may dismiss

young minister, or we may read back

apocalyptic

—

and he

is often

this is significant, the point

later philosophy of history

were

—

referred

to as

we may make

—

a "prophet." Whether or not

is this:

was not expressed

while the content of the

in 1922,

some

of the

words

of this early article is also evident, for at one point

Niebuhr spoke of finding "a way of abolishing the conflict.

" 15

Though he had

earlier spoken of the inevitability of conflict, Niebuhr, in 1922, was
sufficiently

ing conflict.

Cf.

even

sin, conflict, inevitable, prophetic.

The youthfulness

from

own

of his later

His later views certainly became prophetic

philosophy of history.

to his

these words as the hubris

them the aura

into

to his

imbued with

the Social Gospel and

pragmatism

This type of thinking on "conflict" was

to

to

still

speak of abolish-

disappear completely

his thought by the time of the Depression.

Beyond Tragedy

,

pp. 30, 45;

and Human Destiny

"The Church and the Middle Class,

" o£. cit.

,

pp. 319-321.

In 1925, writing in

The Atlantic Monthly

,

Niebuhr again expressed

several of the ingredients of his later philosophy, though in a less incisively

worded form.

D

1 fi

One especially

"spiritual appreciation of

human

significant statement
life. " 1?

In this

was his plea

for a

case he was speaking of a

"social morality" with spiritual underpinnings, but he threw the force of this

argument against "the
ty

man

which

inflicted

hostility of nature. "

He then emphasized

on his fellow men (owing

to "their

that the cruel-

mutual fear and their

greed") was greater than that "from the hostility of the natural world." 18
If

Niebuhr

T

we

tie these

s later

statements together we have an important part of

philosophy of history.

On

the one hand he argued that

could not confront a hostile natural world without spiritual assistance.

was not capable, as a

finite creature, of resisting the

of the natural world.

The reason

that

man

man
Man

temptation and hostility

himself was not simply a "finite"

creature, but rather finite with the capacity to conceive the infinite, was not

explained in 1925.

But the presupposition that

spiritual sustenance against the finite

ment

of Niebuhr s thought.
T

not consign

man

to the

man

is

somehow

in

need of

world does hint toward a later develop-

At this stage we can merely note that Niebuhr did

world of nature, and thus his view of human history

one that must include elements other than the naturalistic.
16

"Can Christianity Survive?" The Atlantic Monthly
84-88.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

,

86.

,

135 (January, 1925),

is

Closely related to this separation of

quent need for supernatural balm,
the

most grievous

of injuries.

nature, and the conse-

warning that man

is the

There

man from

is a definite

inflicts

suggestion that man's

capacity for evil is at least as great as his capacity for good.
the operation of

nature

fail "to

human

institutions,

understand how evil essentially good men can be." 19 As

man. When Niebuhr wrote

of

"

20 he

man's finiteness within nature, and

between men

— the

is the

answer

in the

to the

that "nothing less than a transcendentally

oriented religion is equal to this task,

lem

speaking of

In

Niebuhr noted that liberal views of man's

case of man's confrontation with nature, spiritual help
evil in

upon himself

existence of evil.

An

made reference

to the

to both the

prob-

consequence of this finiteness

article later in the year

same arguments concerning man's imperfection, and

made

the

the need to alleviate this

through the "grace of forgiveness, " the strength for which "requires a high

degree of spiritual passion and imagination.

These arguments, as they relate
should not be

made

too strongly.

to

21

Niebuhr's philosophy of history,

Though the suggestions are there, they are

not elaborated nor are they worded as incisively as they

next decade and one-half.

In

came

to

be over the

1925 he wrote of man's sins against other men,

but he did not develop this thought into a doctrine of "original sin. "

19

Ibid.

,

(In fact,

88

Ibid.

21 "Germany and Modern Civilization," The Atlantic Monthly
847.

135 (June, 1925),

10

Niebuhr

f

s later

doctrine of original sin involved man's relationship with God

rather than man's relations with other men. 22
aid, in the

form

In a similar

"grace of forgiveness,

of the

)

"

He

did suggest that spiritual

was needed

manner, man's confrontation with nature was

in

in

human

need

relations

of super-

natural guidance.

The important elements
of

man, the finiteness

of

in these early thoughts

man, the

inability of

himself, and his resulting spiritual need.

It

man

from 1925 are

to solve his

will later

finiteness of man), 2 ^ and the reality of

In 1927

Religion?

Modern

A

Life

man's reason, an

evil (with the

in history.

implied

24

Niebuhr published his first book, Does Civilization Need

Study in the Social Resources and Limitations of Religion in

.

°

In

it

are contained

many

and civilization that Niebuhr reached

22 Cf. Beyond Tragedy

23

God

problems by

become more obvious

that Niebuhr's philosophy of history exhibits a distrust of

acceptance of the reality and permanence of human

the evil

,

of the conclusions about religion

in the

decade following the First World

pp. 27-30

Donald B. Meyer has written that Niebuhr did not argue the doctrine of
original sin until 1935, in An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
( The
Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941 /Berkeley, 1960/ ,p. 244.)
But a large amount of evidence is available to show that Niebuhr, in the 1920' s,
.

was intrigued with human

evil.

24

These points, as expressed by 1934, are elaborated below

25

Reinhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? A Study in the Social
Resources and Limitations of Religion in Modern Life (New York, 1927).

in chapter

V.

War. He also elaborated for
about

man and

the first time

in this

of religion and civilization.

book are a mirror-image

of

Throughout the book there
significance for

argument

that

modern

man

of his still tentative thoughts

Although he had not yet turned his theology toward a

history.

study of history and its meaning, he did

problems

some

is in

make use

In this sense,

much

is a

of history to illuminate the

many

of the statements

of his later philosophy of history.

complaint that religion had lost

civilization. 26

Yet there

is the equally

its

pervasive

need of religion:

Whatever may be said of specific religions and
religious forms, it is difficult to imagine man
without religion; for religion is the champion of
personality in a seemingly impersonal world.

The argument

in favor of religion

his civilization.

concern for

much

the

was directed toward

Later Niebuhr was to extend

man and

same way

—

saw religion as

serve the same purposes for history.

to

"personality," or

its

"meaning,

"

human

history.

28
Cf.

,

,

p. 302;

and

Human

In

to function as the final

3,

17, 220, 231-232,

p. 4.

Beyond Tragedy

his

Religion was to give history

and religion was

26 Cf. Does Civilization Need Religio n?, pp.
Ibid.

—

" the insights of religion

oo
0
salvation at the end of history in the "impersonal world."*

27

man and

the M champion of personality" for

man, and a bulwark against an "impersonal world,

were

the needs of

or perhaps synthesize

his culture into a consideration of

that he

^

Destiny

,

pp. 287-288.

its

All of the

toward man.

argument

in this early

book was

For the first time Niebuhr spoke

of the world. M

The relevance

by an argument that he was

A
it

of a "religious interpretation

sweep

of religion to the

to continue to

however, directed

not,

of history

was supported

use in his theological view of history:

religions ideal is always a little absurd because
insists on the truth of what ought to be true but

only partly true;

however the ultimate wisdom
because reality slowly approaches the ideals which are
is

it is

implicit in its life.^9

The religious interpretation

world is essentially
real and that the real can

of the

an insistence that the ideal is
be under stood only in the light of the ideal. 30

What Niebuhr was saying here,

in 1927,

and what was

to

become

the essence

of his later philosophy of history, is that the realities of history could be fully

comprehended "only in

the light of the ideal."

the irrationality of religion

The form

much

criticized

of

—

—

argument

paradox.

the force of reason

the "ultimate
is that for

The

The "ideal" was the absurdity,

wisdom."

which Niebuhr

remains helpless

that

it

would be more proper

^ Does
3Q

Ibid.

One student

Civilization

,

well-known

fact that an absurdity gives

is

a paradox.

if

—

and

meaning whereas

At this point there

a tendency to dismiss Niebuhr's views on history as,
least irrelevant.

is

may be

not sophistical, at

of Niebuhr s philosophy of history has argued

to

T

speak of his "theology of history.

Need Religion?

,

" 31

The

pp. 44-45.

p. 46.

Georgette Vignaux, La Theologie de I'Histoire chez Reinhold Niebuhr pp. 5,
27. Robert L. Cal&oun saw fit to label the second volume of The Nature and
Destiny of Man as "a theological interpretation of history. " The Journal of
Religion, 24 /January, 1944/, 59.)
,

(

reason given for the inadequacy of the term "philosophy" of history
philosophy presupposes rationality, and, according

be fully comprehended in rational terms.
is a

more adequate

to

is that

Niebuhr, history cannot

Therefore, a "theology" of history

description of a theory that relies on paradox and the

supernatural.

The whole problem
of this paper.

Although

reason, philosophy

may

of philosophy versus theology is beyond the scope

it is

true that a theology negates an insistence upon

do the same.

reason gives no guarantee that
irrational posit.

its

Even a philosophy which

presupposition

—

reason

Without extending this line of argument,

I

—

is

based upon

is not itself

will

assume

our purposes the interchangeability of the terms philosophy and theology
relation to interpretations of history.

For the sake

of clarity,

I

will

an

for

in

speak

only of Niebuhr s "philosophy" of history, with the understanding that the preT

suppositions remain theological.

±±
The introduction
significant step taken in

of

paradox

into his

argument

is

perhaps the most

Does Civilization Need Religion?

several other important ingredients to Niebuhr

f

s

,

but there are

philosophy of history in this

book.

One reason

for Niebuhr s use of paradox is that

movement between an

T

it

allows a degree of

insistence upon both the relativity of

human decisions

and the absolute ideal under which those decisions supposedly are made.

In

14

1935 he was to speak of the
in 1927 he

M

relevance of an impossible ethical ideal,

used the same type

of

argument.

difficulty of absolutizing religious ethics

we are

in

on account of the relativities of histo the feeling that

possession of an absolute set of ethics. 33 Turning this argument

we see

around,

and

he insisted upon the

In this case

remained strong due

tory; yet the temptation to dogmatize

M 32

the

manner

in

which Niebuhr was

to attack those

who absolut-

ized their own vision of history from a naturalistic or a rationalistic basis. 3 ^

These

remained within the

latter visions, by definition,

and were thus guilty of judging history from a point

in

"relativities of history"

time within history.

Niebuhr posited his irrational absolute outside of history
tion with ethics

—

—

in 1927 in

connec-

and could therefore speak of an interpretation of history that

was not influenced by the

relativities of history.

This point

—

is

clearly stated

in

mirror-image

—

in the following

passage:

The moral effectiveness

of religion depends upon

detach itself from the historical
relativities with which its ideals are inevitability
compounded in the course of history. °°
its ability to

This sentence suggests Niebuhr
that a vision of history not be

T

s

desire

immersed

—

in 1927 directed

toward religion

—

in the relativities of history, but

rather stand above history with untarnished ideals.

However unsatisfactory

32 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York, 1935; Cleveland, 1956),

chapter 4.
33 Does Civili z ation Need Religion?

,

pp. 221-222.

34The most concentrated body of Niebuhr s criticism of "modern" philosophies
of history is contained in Faith and Histo ry, chapters 2-5.
T

35

Does Civilization Need Religion?,

p. 222.

this line of

reasoning may be

to a rationalist,

it

does have the advantage c f

pretending to hold knowledge with an authority beyond that of human
ability.

That Niebuhr calls such knowledge the "ultimate wisdom"
That he should be accused of hiding behind paradox
if

his initial presupposition of the limitations of

In

any case, the form of argument

is

is a logical step.

is also logical,

human reason

is

but only

not granted.

indeed that of paradox.

The quotation given above, as applied
as a too liberal reading of Niebuhr s intent.
f

to history, is not to

In 1927

be construed

he was fully prepared to

relate history (as well as ethics) with God:

Though God works his will against the inertia of the
concrete world and the waywardness of man, neither
science nor history justifies the conclusion that his
resources are not ultimately equal to the creative

The intractableness

world makes the
creative and redemptive struggle real but not hope-

task.

of the

less. 36

The contention

made through

is explicit that

God

is

a force in history.

is

order."
38

It

causes

man

is this sort of

to envision

that

it

himself as unique in the "cosmic

pride that Niebuhr was later to identify as man's

Pride colors man's ambitions with the desire for perfection and eternity

within history.
36 Ibid.

,

p. 218.

37ibid.

,

p. 53.

38 Cf.

The counter -argument,

a force unto himself, is answered by Niebuhr with the accusation that

is pride alone that

sin.

is not

positive empirical means, but rather through the negative reason-

ing that a supernatural force cannot be disproved.

man

The argument

Beyond Tragedy

,

pp. 27-30.

This important doctrine of original sin was given a clear statement

in

this early book:

If

men disavow

all faith in a

power not

their

own

which makes for righteousness, they cannot finally
save themselves from either arrogance or despair.
Both the sin of pride, through arrogance, and the despair that comes from a
too pessimistic view of

human

history could be alleviated (though not elimi-

nated) by the acceptance of both "naive faith" and the reality of limitations

upon

man

r

s "critical intelligence." 40

—

method of introducing two extremes

pessimism

—

(despair)

This argument
in this

is typical of

Niebuhr's

case optimism (arrogance) and

and working toward a greater truth between the two.

His philosophy of history later became the expression of man's ability
the events within the relativities of history

But since

man

himself

is

from

to

view

a position beyond history.

41

caught in history, he cannot absolutize his perceptions

into laws.

He can only have

This saves

man from

faith that his

despair, and at the

view of history does have meaning.

same time

takes

from him

gance which comes with knowledge based upon anything naturalistic.

knowledge of the meaning of history

is

based on a

the arro-

Man's

faith.

Niebuhr, in 1927, saw the choice as one "between the moral ennui of

pessimism and

" 42
the sentimentality of an unqualified optimism.

39 Does Civilization

4Q

Ibid.

,

Need Religion?

p. 52.

p. 123.

41 See Beyond Tragedy
42

,

,

pp. 188-193.

Does Civilization Need Religion?,

p.

194; cf. p. 209.

The

"sentimentality" that he suggested was the optimistic view of human nature,

which seemed too absolute a doctrine

The impoi-tant

behavior.

point,

to

account for the varieties of human

however,

opposing polarities, and then merged them.

— was man

clouded
history?

he set up two sharply

is the fact that

In the

process the issue became

good or evil? Was he capable of discerning meaning

The result was a paradox; confusion was

left

in

by the elimination of

absolutes capable of comprehension through man's "critical intelligence." But

Niebuhr was insistent upon

this destruction of clear-cut

Am. absolute dualism either between

or between

opposing forces:

God and the universe

man and

nature, or spirit and matter, or
good and evil, is neither possible or necessary. ^3

While he deprecated man's

ability to

reason his way

to

an optimistic

view of human Mature, he did not therefore contend that the goodness of man

was limited by the extent

of

man's

"critical intelligence."

there to be "undeveloped resources" of

human

Rather, he imagined

love and creativity that could be

tapped only by faith. 44

Two

Niebuhr saw

is that

In

44
45
4fi

fit

on several occasions

to

The

first

speak of the "tragedy of history."

each case the meaning did not involve the apocalyptic sense that the "tragedy

of history"

43

further semantic points about this book should be made.

was

46
to later imply.

Ibid.

,

p. 20©,

Ibid.

,

pp. 41-42; cf. p. 22,

Ibid., pp. 185, 208.

See

Human

Destiny, pp. 47-52.

Yet the phrase

—

that

was

later to carry so

18

much meaning - was used
Niebuhr

T

The second point has

in 1927.

s fascination with the idea of the "prophet. "

to do again with

In defending the

prophet

against the priest, he wrote this:

There is no way of guaranteeing the reality of God
if someone does not make him real in experience,
and there is no way of declaring the victory of the
ideal if someone does not defeat reality in the name
of the ideal in history.^
It is

apparent that Niebuhr s prophet
T

is

someone who stands

a step above the

"relativities of history, " yet, for the sake of countering the false reality with

a true ideal,

is

also capable of stepping down into history.

One might suggest

that Niebuhr s prophet is a philosopher of history.
T

_5.

The overall contribution
philosophy of history

is

of

Does Civilization Need Religion?

impressive.

it

became

in later

to history,

This controversial device was

to

philosophy of history but also his theology.
question of

human

evil,

human nature. The

T

s

nor was the language

works.

The most important factor introduced was
paradox.

Niebuhr

Yet the arguments, though present, had not

been consciously formulated as they may relate
as decisive as

to

the methodological one of

become

the crux not only to Niebuhr s
r

Another significant element

is the

and the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations

evil inherent in

man became one reason

that

man

of

could not

himself in history. 4y

fulfill

because his

evil

intelligence."
for

incapable of creating his own destiny

would continually corrupt the best efforts of his "critical

This

is

what makes the theory of human sin an ti -rationalist,

presupposes that man

it

Man was

is

unable to

fulfill his

able to create a "heaven on earth, M or a Utopia.

own
In

history, that he is un-

an article in 1928 Niebuhr

repeated this theme:

The war convinced me that religion can be effective
only if it resists the embraces of civilization. The
moral and religious ideal is in conflict with civilization as much as with nature. There is, indeed, no
easy road to the millennium. ^9

The language

is of religion,

but the

same reasoning was

also directed toward

history.
In short, the introduction of

slights

human reason because

it

human

sin into a philosophical system

imposes a limit on reason's capacity.

One

thing that reason cannot do is escape the relativities of history and foresee the

"end" of history.

mism:

made

Either history can be consigned to meaninglessness (pessi-

despair) or the present reality can be excerpted

absolute (optimism:

arrogance).

Niebuhr in the form of paradox,

4^For two examples

is that

from

the relativity and

The third alternative, suggested by

man can know

the end of history by faith

of liberal backlash against Niebuhr s introduction of
1

human

sin into his philosophy of history, see Sidney Hook, "Intelligence and Evil in

History: An Answer to Intellectual Defeatism, " Commentary 3 (Mar
1947), 210-221; and Charles Frankel, The Case for Modem Man (New York,
1955), chapter 6.

Human

"What the War Did
1928), 1162-1163.

,

to

My

Mind,

"

The Christian Century

,

45 (September 27,

20

thus curing his despair

—

history

T

yet continue to function within the relativities of

thus saving himself from arrogance. 50

of history are

Niebuhr

—

more

s point in

The

first

two philosophies

rational in that they do not introduce the supernatural.

Does Civilization Need Religion? was

that, despite the

irrationality of supernatural belief, civilization did indeed need

elaborated

more

explicitly the

upon the supernatural.

it.

He

later

need for an effective philosophy of history based

^

50

The discussion below,

51

complete treatment was published
of an Era, in 1934. See below, chapter V.

chapter V, explains the way in which Niebuhr
elaborated this paradox in the form of an immanent-transcendent God.

The

first partially

in

in Reflections

on the

Ill

THE

(PART

1920 S
T

2)

Reinhold Niebuhr' s second book, Leaves
Cynic,

52

Niebuhr

T

was published

s

years

in 1929.

in Detroit,

The work was

from 1915

Theological Seminary in 1929,

many

to

From
in the

the Notebook of a

form

of a diary for

Although he was at the Union

1928.

of the thoughts of this diary

remain those

of a young pastor in the process of developing a personal theology.

reason the work
it

some ways

is in

the

serves as an intimate introduction

most revealing
to the

Tamed

For

this

of Niebuhr' s books,

and

man's thought.

2Although Does Civilization Need Religion? was published only one year
before this diary was completed, there are some relevant passages in the Leaves
that bear on Niebuhr 's philosophy of history, and which

sharp

first point has to do with

Niebuhr

T

clear example of the intermingling of Niebuhr

had

into as

a focus in the earlier book.

The

tory.

were not brought

In

an entry

in 1925,

s

T

Christology

s

—

and here

is a

theology with his vision of his-

Niebuhr confessed that after years of questioning, he

finally found a role for the crucifixion:

it

was

the

"symbol of ultimate

reality.

because the cross of Christ symbolizes something in
the very heart of reality, something in universal experience
that it has its central place in history. Life is tragic and
the most perfect tvpe of moral beauty inevitably has at least
It is

a touch of the tragic in

52 Reinhold Niebuhr,

New York,
53 Ibido

,

it.

uo

Leav es From the Notebook

1957).

pp. 106-107.

of a

Tamed Cynic

(Chicago, 1929;

22

The two important features

was placed

of this interpretation are that the Christ-image

at the center of historical reality,

become "mythical"). A

as symbolic (later to

and that the image was accepted
further element is the statement

that "life is tragic, " with the implication that the

redemption from

depends upon the symbolic reality of the cross of Christ.
all later

developed integrally into Niebuhr

An

entry in 1926 argued the

The history

same

T

s philosophy of

.

history.^

point:

of

.

destiny of love not only in history but in the universe.
In this year, 1926,

tragedy

These images were

every nation and every people makes
the crucifixion a perennial and a universal historical
fact .... The cross is central in the Christian
religion
because it symbolizes a cosmic as well
as an historic truth .... The cross of Jesus is truly
the most adequate symbol of both the strategy and the
.

life's

^

Niebuhr had already accepted as true the "absurdity" of the

crucifixion as a perennial historical truth.

He even accepted

the non-scientific

nature of his discovery:

The ultimate nature

of reality cannot be grasped by

science alone; poetic imagination is as necessary
u
as scientific precision.
"Reality" was not, therefore, the exclusive province of scientific reason.

See Human Destiny pp. 36-37, for a statement of the central meaning of
Christ in history, Cf also Beyond Tragedy chapter 15.
,

.

'

'

Leaves

,

,

pp. 122-123.

Niebuhr at this time, and later, was not hesitant about using
the word "absurd" to describe his beliefs.
Ibid.

,

p. 145.

A good example

of

Niebuhr

T

method

s

of introducing two polarities and

then combining them to arrive at the "truth" is this entry in 1927:

Fundamentalists have at least one characteristic in
common with most scientists. Neither can understand that poetic and religious imagination has a way
of arriving at truth by giving a clue to the total meaning of things without being in any sense an analytic
description of detailed facts.

^

The fundamentalists, who take Biblical teachings
cally,

and the scientists, who refuse

to

literally rather than

accept either the literal or the symbolic

truth of the "religious imagination," both suffer, in Niebuhr's view,
inability to

grasp the "total meaning of things.

intelligible only as fulfilled

used

to gain this

answer

—

subject.

Meaning

is

dialectical reasoning

The meaning

—

is,

in part,

is incorrect, but they fail to give

attained

fundamentalist or scientific

"

when the search

—

is

The method
paradoxical.

meaning

—

to their

whether

is

relevant as

more than an example

His Neo -Orthodoxy and his distrust of reason

created in his mind the feeling that he was "talking like a fundamentalist.

expressed this feeling

Ibid.

,

pp. 166-167.

is

abandoned.

This point about fundamentalism
of one of Niebuhr's polarities.

for literal truth

from an

(in history)

by theological (non-literal) truths.

Neither of the two polarities

symboli-

in 1928 after

making the following statement:

"

He

24

They /modern religious educators/ want

a

completely rational faith and do not realize that
they are killing religion by a complete rationalization .... Life is a battle between faith and reason
in which each feeds on the other, drawing
sustenance from it and destroying it
.Reason,
without the balance of faith, destroys a civilization
.^8
soon enough
.

.

Niebuhr

T

upon the

his attempt to

human

More

He was unwilling

to

meaningful expression of

in history.

was

the thinking he
In

into a

deny one or the other in his search for

Niebuhr's denial that religion

tory.

only to the point of placing limits

importantly, his philosophy of history became

combine "faith" and "reason"

destiny.

meaning

reason.

.

.

became "fundamentalist"

s theology

utility of

.

.

is

"an end in itself" 59 is also typical of

later to apply to the relationship between religion and his-

a similar way that history cannot

a reality "beyond history,
relativities and

millennium

—

made

that

" religion

fulfill itself,

could not be divorced from history's

the fulfillment of life.

would be unveiled only

also at the end of religion (as

but is dependent upon

Religion did not guarantee the

at the

end of history, and therefore

known by man)

One other revealing statement

in this

book has

to do with prophets:

Philosophers are not usually prophets. They are
too reasonable and circumspect to create or preserve the prophetic vision. u

For useful accounts of the Neo-Orthodox movement, see James
M. Connolly, Human History and the Word of God (New York, 1965), pp. 105118; and Edward J. Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (Grand Rapids,

58 Ibid.

,

p.

188.

1951), pp. 13-39.
59 Ibid.

6Q

Ibid.

,

p. 196.

,

p. 220.

Again,

it is

the prophet rather than the philosopher

interpretive sense of history.

more "prophetic" than

who appealed

to

Niebuhr

T

s

His later philosophy of history was to be much

"philosophic.

2.

Niebuhr

T

s Detroit diary

does not add pivotal elements to his philosophy

of history, nor is there any systematization of his thinking.

the parish environment to the academic
in 1928

was a major factor

vital influences

in his

community

at

The change from

Union Theological Seminary

development over the next ten years.

were the Depression and the coming

of the

Two

Second World V/ar.

Before following the course of his development through these years,
will be useful to look

his

most

back

at

what Niebuhr had learned

significant discovery

the usefulness of paradox.

—

in the 1920 s.
T

doxical in spite of itself, in the 1920

T

—

v/as

much

theological writing is supposedly para-

s this

was not a common method

Both fundamentalism and "social science" held deep roots

of argument.

in religious

thinking;^

neither relished the accusation that they were "absurd." Niebuhr elevated

was

to elevate

—

it

Perhaps

in relation to his philosophy of history

Although

other

—

or

absurdity into respectability in the form of paradox.

The other methodological form already evident
dialectical argument.

The transference

be pointed out that Niebuhr

T

s dialectical

in the 1920 s
T

was

that of

of ideas is difficult to judge, but

method was

little different

from

it

must

the

61 "Social science" often implies "religious" presuppositions in that a single
whether about man or one particular aspect of man — is believed
truth

—

without any significant qualification.

2G

dialectical theology first expounded by Karl Earth in 1918 in

Romans.

The purpose

God against the
this dialectical

of Earth's dialectic

relativities of history. 62

method

was

to

The Epistle

to the

maintain the transcendence of

Niebuhr did not immediately apply

to history, but in the 1920 s he did begin to
f

argue for a

higher truth from a base of two polarities. 63
In this connection

we have

also noted that, in terms of subject-matter,

Niebuhr had not yet directed his attention
the

to the

problem

of history.

arguments by which he presented his theology were the same

employ

later to

in a

systematic approach

able to discover in these earlier writings

to history.

For

this

many antecedents

However,

that he

was

reason we are

of his later philoso-

phy of history.

The Christ-image
thinking.

an especially important element in Niebuhr

is

He was conscious

having perennial meaning.

complex system

of

of its relevance, in 1925, as a

T

s

symbolic event

Later, this symbolism was to expand into a more

myths by which the New Testament teachings were given

an eternal meaning in history.^ The Christ-image was also to serve as the

Thomas W.

Ogletree, C hristian Faith and History:
of Ernest Troeltsch and Karl Barth (New York, 1965)
Cf.

From

A

Critical

Comparison

1928 to the 1950 s Niebuhr and Barth have conducted a somewhat random
"debate, " with the bulk of material coming from Niebuhr s pen. D. B. Robertson has collected Niebuhr s articles on Barth for convenient study in Reinhold
Niebuhr: Essays in Applied Christianity (Cleveland, 1959), pp. 141-193. For
a useful review of the controversy see June Bingham, Courage to Change: An
Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1961),
pp. 337-344.
T

T

T

See Niebuhr s article, "The Truth in Myths," in The Nature of R eligious
E xperience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh (New York, 1937)
r

crucial point of contact between

man and God —

the contact through which history

was given meaning.

Two

particular elements that were given

the capacity of
or, his reason.

man

to do evil,

The doctrine

of evil, or sin,

which man's arrogance before God

to

consummate

meaning

the utility of

his pride

to his pride.

reason alone would not enable man
filled the

—

was not yet elaborated

own history. Nor was man's

reason yet explicitly related

of history.

in the 1920' s

are

and the limitations of man's critical intelligence,

in

his

some mention

—

included his futile attempts

fascination with the doctrine of

Niebuhr did realize, however, that

to attain the ideal which,

at the

he suggested, ful-

he placed strictures upon

In an article in 1929,

man's reason, and

to the stage

same time argued

the need for the irra-

tional, the absurd:

The function

of religion is to preserve life's highest

irrationality, the urge

toward the ideal

....

Completely rational ideals are either completely
separated from the world or reality, or completely
identified with it. In either case moral vigor is
Without faith, therefore, a reasonable
lost.
00
life must sink into unreasonable pessimism.
.

It

is

.

.

perhaps too easy

to

read

into these early writings the

more mature

thoughts of the later works, especially when one is dealing with so amorphous
a subject as a philosophy of history.

thought is both

covered.

It

more

intelligible

and less "absurd" when

would seem apparent

of history Niebuhr developed

at this stage that

was not

65 "The Unhappy Intellectuals,"

However, the later and more systematic

set apart

its

roots are un-

whatever formal philosophy

from

his intellectual growth as a

The Atlantic Monthly

,

143 (June, 1929),

794.

Nor

whole.

is it especially

rewarding

to

isolation

from the early thought patterns

unfair

may be

it

to

speak of his philosophy of history
that guided its evolution.

overemphasize shadowy references

altogether too simplistic to
entirely understood

assume

in

However

in early writings,

it

is

that Niebuhr s philosophy of history can be
T

from The Nature and Destiny

of

Man

or Faith and History

.

IV

THE EARLY

In the

1930 S
T

decade of the Depression, Reinhold Niebuhr published five books

two in 1932, one

in 1934,

one in 1935, and one in 1937.

He then delivered

—

the

Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in the spring and fall of 1939, and published them
in

1941 and 1943.

Still

another book was published in 1940.

published in 1932, the first, The Contribution of Religion

Of the two books

to Social

of little value in the discussion of Niebuhr s philosophy of history.
T

book, Moral

some

Man and Immoral

Society:

A

Work ,^

is

The other

Study in Ethi cs and Politics,

^ is of

value, though its concentration is not yet directed systematically toward

history.

Moral Man and Immoral Society was Niebuhr
and

it

T

s first

major publication,

established his reputation as an important American theologian.

been known through his articles
Monthly

in the 1920' s, but the

in

The Christian Century and The

Atlantic

appointment to the Union Theological Seminary,

and the publication of a sharply worded book on contemporary society,
the theological content was minimal, thrust

secular limelight.

him

He has remained there ever

into both the secular

in

which

and non-

since.

66 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Contribution of Religion to Social
67

He had

Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society:
Politics (New York, 1932).

A

Work (New York,

Study in Ethics and

1932).

30

The key argument
individual

men

whereas men

in

Moral Man and Immoral Society was

could exercise certain moral restraints on their sinful tendencies,

in

groups were not burdened by an individual sense of morality,

and were therefore capable of much greater

new

to

that

He had shown

Niebuhr's thinking.

evil.

This thought was by no means

his awareness of a difference between

individual and group morality in an article in 1927,^8 and in

Need Religion ? he had written

that "all

human groups tend

Does Civilization

to

be more predatory

than the individuals which compose them."

The difference was

expanded these undeveloped statements

major thesis about man and society.

The book therefore marks
it

into a

that in 1932 he

the beginning of Niebuhr s systematic thought
T

—

though

was not yet directed toward history,

_2.

A

major theme

of

Moral Man and Immoral Society

upon man's relationship with history,

is the inability of

,

and one which bears

man's reason

to control

his collective behavior:

Modern educators are, like rationalists of all the
ages, too enamoured of the function of reason in
The world of history, particularly in man's
life.
collective behavior, will never be conquered by
reason, unless reason uses tools, and is itself
70
driven by forces which are not rational.

68 "A Critique of Pacifism," The Atlantic Monthly
esp. 639.

69

Does Civilization Need Religion?

70 Moral

Man and Immoral

,

p. 129.

Society, pp. xv-xvi.

,

139 (May, 1927), 637-641,

31

But Niebuhr did not devote his whole attention

to the limitations of

pure reason,

for he also added a chapter on the "religious resources" (and limitations) of

human

society.

Again, we see that he set up polarities

—

reason and religion -

and worked from them.

The weakness

human nature

to

the beginning of the assumptions of

From

the Enlightenment.

two-fold error:
to the

(1)

that

force of reason,

of utopia

—

was

that

it

presumed

be amenable to the logic of one particular dogmatism, i.e.

He traced

reason.

of reason, according to Niebuhr,

whether

it

perfectability to

that period, he wrote, rationalists have exhibited a

man

(2)

human

is essentially a rational

creature who will submit

that the force of reason will direct

man

to

some

type

be capitalistic, socialistic, or communistic

Although he admitted that there were "possibilities of increasing social
justice through the development of
alists

was

utility of

that they

reason.

assumed

too

mind and reason,

much concerning

"

'

both

1 the

error of the ration-

human nature and

Niebuhr believed that the rationalists were naive

the

to think that

"reason" would triumph over "power."

merely because
their dishonesties have been revealed or because
they have discovered their own deceptions. Wherever
men hold unequal power in society, they will strive to

Men

will not cease to be dishonest,

maintain
In addition to this,

more prone
71 Ibid.
72

73

to act

,

p. 34

,

p. 35

Ibid.
Ibid.

it.

men

*

will

become less

susceptible to reason and moralism, and

on impulse, when they congregate in groups.

73

32

This gloomy analysis of the nature of

man

is not the sort of thinking
to

that an optimistic social scientist (or a politician)

The portion

of truth

from which Niebuhr expanded

concerning the limitation of reason

would be likely

to

produce.

into a polarity his doctrine

is the following:

Even the most rational men are never quite rational
when their own interests are at stake. 74

The problem with reason was
cisely, the

that

man who used reason

was acting within history, with

it

could not get outside itself.

exclusively would

Reason could

have

to

admit that he

and preconditioning that

all of the relativity

implied by an act within history.

still

Or more pre-

is

not, therefore, be the final

arbitrator for the self because even reason was dependent upon the person who

used

When

it.

this line of

of a truely impartial

argument was applied

men

groups, the efficacy

in

reason became correspondingly more tenuous.

Although he was seeking primarily
that rationalists

to

made concerning

to criticize the

extensive assumptions

the use of reason in society as a whole,

Niebuhr also drew into the discussion some comment upon the individual ego.

He made

a tentative step toward defining

of reason"

—

human self-consciousness

as the instrument which caused

became aware

of his finitude,

75
of the eternal.

and

at the

This conflict within

man

same

man

—

to

seek the

,

p. 44.

75 Ibid.

,

pp. 41-42.

76

See

Human

Nature, pp. 182-186.

infinite.

"the fruit

Man

instant recognized the possibility

later elaborated and designated as

a prime reason for man's search for meaning in history
74 Ibid.

—

—

was not here developed.
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But a vital question arises:

if

man must be wary

what means shall he direct his life? The answer
Niebuhr did not intend

to give

an easy solution.

to this is not simple,

human

and

Furthermore, the emphasis

Moral Man and Immoral Society was not theological.
analysis of

own reason, by

of his

of

But the pessimistic

nature, as shown in the light of reason (with Niebuhr

T

s help)

implied an effort to supply some further "resources" to bolster up man's
vision of himself and society.
In

terms

77

of his philosophy of history, this chapter

resources" was the

first systematic attack

In this sense the dike

was thereafter opened

on man's "critical intelligence."
for the promulgation of a philosophy

of history based on presuppositions other than

treatment was not contained in Moral
tant that the systematic

on man's "rational

man's reason.

Man and Immoral

groundwork was being

This systematic

Society

but

,

it

is

impor-

laid, in 1932, for his later philoso-

phy of history.

3.

The "resources" by which Niebuhr presumed
optimism) of a purely rational vision of history
religion.

to put the

pessimism

into equilibrium,

were those

"
Religion provided "a sense of the absolute.

the relative perspectives of the historic
scene, there is no human action which cannot be justified in terms of some historic purpose or approved in
comparison with some less virtuous action. The

Viewed from

absolute reference of religion eliminates these partial

perspectives and premature justifications.
77 See below section 3 of this chapter.
78 Moral Man and Immoral S ociety p. 52.
,

(or

of
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An

absolute, in the

form

of religion,

was Niebuhr's answer

to the relativities

of history.

Niebuhr understood the despair of men who recognized the existence
an ideal, yet who saw no way

to realize that ideal in history. 79

On

of

the other

hand, he decided that those who did profess to see progress in history, and

who located the

ideal within the historical process,

the particular "progress" that

More simply,
from

was made, and

must have some stake

the privileged classes do not "suffer as

the brutalities of

was

the "ideal" that

much

in

identified. 80

as the disinherited

contemporary society, and therefore do not take as

catastrophic a view of contemporary history. " 81 hi the eyes of the disinherited
MP

—

and the "truly religious man"

it

But this was not, according

moralism

in judging history.

in history

has ever been known

was a warning

He
to

—

was not man who redeemed history but God.
to

Niebuhr, a call for complete religious

felt it to

be an "obvious fact" that "no nation

be purely unselfish in

its actions. " 82

that religious idealism, no less than rational idealism,

Here

needed

to

be tempered at every step by a "realistic" appraisal of man's position within the
relativities of history.

The realization

that

man

acted within history, and yet was

*
-

in

possession of an ideal whose source was above history, did not remove from

man

the responsibility of

relative

—

that

were presented.

timentality or to abdicate

79 Ibid.
8Q

Ibid.

,

p. 61.

,

p. 62.

,

p. 75.

81 Ibid.
82ibid.

making decisions commensurate with

To do otherwise would be

from human history and escape

the facts

—

however

either to lapse into sen-

to an "ivory

tower."

In spite of this

"resource"

—

warning

—

this limitation placed

the value of religion to

human

on the religious

history was not in doubt.

Without the ultrarational hopes and passions of religion
no society will ever have the courage to conquer despair
and attempt the impossible; for the vision of a just
society is an impossible one, which can be approximated
only by those who do not regard it as impossible. The
truest visions of religion are illusions, which may be
partially realized by being resolutely believed. For
what religion believes to be true is not wholly true but
ought to be true; and may become true if its truth is
not doubted. 83

The passage

is

representative of an important element in Niebuhr

T

s

philosophy of history.

This is the belief that human wisdom could only approxi-

mate the

ideal society,

and that the Utopian religious visions, when applied

history,

were

illusions.

Yet

at the

same time these

illusions

to

were "true";

»

they were an "impossible ideal" that ought to be possible but was not.

was a paradox: man should

By arguing

in this

certain presuppositions.

means

sible by

natural ideal,

of

live by an impossible ideal.

way, Niebuhr had committed his vision of history

The

first

was

assumed by a

entirely earth-bound:

it

It

its limits

alternative also failed to fulfill

,

p. 81.

was impos-

that the super-

vision, and the hope that

was an impossible

had no further assistance

3 Ibid.

to

religious interpretation, was also incapable of

would be achieved within history was an

and

that a fulfillment to history

human reason and wisdom. The second was

realization within history.

This

illusion.

(i.e., those of

to

The

man

1

s

first presupposition

history.

But

it

was

reason) were explicit,

render man's historical dilemma.

human

it

The second

was a supernatural

would

presupposition:
"Realistically"

it

be of any value for

this

would not

being approximated.

—

In 1932,

it

man

was an impossible

within history?
ideal, capable only of

Niebuhr did not pursue this problem.

the value of the "true illusion"

was found:

it

gave meaning

Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr did not

Later,

to history.

fully consider the

84

In

problem

of

history, and his systematic analysis of rational and religious presuppositions
did not logically instill history with anything but meaninglessness.

_4.

The rest
Niebuhr

T

of

Moral Man and Immoral Society did not add

philosophy of history.

s

"perennial tragedy of

human

life, "

cal than systematic.
self in society,

There were times when he spoke

human history,"

and "the end

of history, " but these

f

did, in these early

Marxism.

references were more rhetori-

His concentration remained upon rnan s relations with him-

own history and with God were not included

interest in

of the

the "spiritual and brutal elements in

upon his ethics, and his politics.

Niebuhr

significantly to

In

Man

T

s relationship with his

in the discussion.

years of the Depression, display a strong

1931 he noted, with appreciation, that the communist

oc
00
vision of history v/as "catastrophic and apocalyptic rather than evolutionary."

His own philosophy of history was far from evolutionary, though he had not yet
systematically explained

its

apocalyptic tone.

See the first chapter of Beyond Tragedy

,

In

which

regard

to the

is entitled

Marxian vision

"As Deceivers, Yet

True."
8

"The Religion

of

Communism," The

Atlantic Monthly, 147 (April, 1931), 463.
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of history, he went on to

warn

that its absoluteness placed

it

in "the category

of religious overbeliefs rather than that of scientific truths. " 86

His own

philosophy of history also became divorced from "scientific truths,
did not create the "overbelief" of absolutizing his
In 1932, Niebuhr

of

was not unaware

man, society, and history.

lation to

And he even made

man's

but he

history.

of the relationship between his view

He could refer

his "highest ideals" in "social and collective
of history.

dogma within

"

to the failure of

man

to

achieve

terms" as a perennial tragedy

the direct reference to "beyond history" in re-

life in history:

It is

inevitable that religious imagination should set

goals beyond history.

But this suggestion was not elaborated, either

in his articles

or in Moral

Man

and Immoral Society.

He

man and

did no

society.

more than use

history to support his arguments concerning

For example, the following passage

is indicative of his

discus

sion of formal "philosophy of history" in the early 1930 s.
T

which proceeds under the
assumption that a religious change of heart or type
of social education will make one economic group
perfectly ethical toward another economic group
without some pressure from the underprivileged
group, is discredited by the facts of history. 88

Any philosophy

of history

Philosophy of history was subservient

to the "facts of

history." Niebuhr was to

retain a portion of this emphasis, but not in the simple

86

M oral

87 "Must

88

Man and Immoral

We Do

Society

,

p.

form expressed here.

167.

Nothing?" The Christian Century

,

49 (March 30, 1932), 417.

"Socialism and Christianity," The Christian Century, 48 (Aug. 19, 1931), 1039

His philosophy of history was to break away from history enough

assume

to

a

certain independence from the relativity of history's facts.

Although Moral

Man and Immoral

Society contributed nothing to Niebuhr'

systematic philosophy of history aside from the bounds placed upon reason, and
the presupposition that the fulfillment of history was

were later

did offer several suggestive arguments that

Niebuhr recognized the problem
not before.

He judged

that

much

of the

of

TT

beyond history,
to

M the

become important.

absolutism early in the 1930

economic misery

book

in the

T

—

s

if

world was the

result of situations which lent themselves to destructive, absolutist tendencies
in

However, he did not jump

men.

in the other direction.

Absolutism, in both religious and political idealism,
is a splendid incentive to heroic action, but a
dangerous guide in immediate and concrete situations.
In religion it permits absurdities and in politics cruelties, which fail to achieve justifying consequences
because the inertia of human nature remains a nemesis
to the absolute ideal.

Niebuhr was unwilling

to

89

grant to reason the assurance of absolute relevance;

neither would he absolutize a religious idealism.
the less certain support of paradox.

they were less dangerous, Niebuhr
explicitly

I

was

pronounced the Truth

If

felt,

in the

more than

was

produced absurdities

this

to

—

depend upon

and

it

did

—

than those rendered by arguments which

form

have suggested above that Niebuhr

little

Instead, he

of an Absolute.

1

s philosophy of history at this

time

a device for marshalling facts to support a presupposition.

This tendency to submit his philosophy of history to the test of history s "facts"
T

OQ

Moral Man and Immoral Society,

p. 199.

remained with Niebuhr.
given to the facts

—

The unanswerable question concerns the interpretation

whether they support one philosophy of history or another.

Nevertheless, the desire to match his philosophy in some way with history
relativities

out Moral

remained important for Niebuhr.

Man and Immoral

Society.

of the relations between whites and
that

This desire

is illustrated

1

s

through-

For example, after a perceptive analysis

Negroes

in

America

—

in

which he wrote

Negroes would never achieve complete emancipation "merely by trusting

in the

moral sense

of the white race"

the white race in
to equal rights

point one

—

America

if it is

may speak

he argued that
will not

admit the Negro

not forced to do so.

Upon

that

with a dogmatism which all his-

tory justifies. 90

Niebuhr not only

felt that history

could

cation allowed one to be dogmatic.

historical justifications.

It

rhetorical than significant.

may

He was never

"justify, " but that this justifi-

so bold in expounding his supra-

well be that the assertive words were

The historian

the thunder and lightning for the rain.

Ibid., pp. 252-253.

somehow

more

of ideas does run the risk of mistaking
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V
THE MIDDLE

With Reflections on the End
to the first

major work

in

1930'S

of an

(PART

Era

^ published in 1934,

Reinhold Niebuhr's philosophy of history.

nor even primarily, devoted

is not wholly,

,

1)

to

we come
The book

philosophy of history, but of

its

twenty chapters several are genuine landmarks in the systematic exposition of

The hope for

his philosophy of history.

book was the following:

this

Perhaps they /the "reflections'^/ will help a little
to shake the easy faith by which the actual and tragic
facts of contemporary history are, in the opinion of
the present writer, obscured.

The shaking of the "easy
a

new vision

faith n necessitated

of history for

tory needed to be

made

^

men

—

in addition to other factors

middle 1930' s.

in the

A new meaning for

—

his-

explicit. ^3

JL.

Perhaps the most important chapter

"Mythology and

is that entitled

History. " In this chapter, Niebuhr spoke of the kind of philosophy of history

which he deemed adequate, and he discussed the importance

A

of

meaning

in history.

philosophy of history must relate the empiricism of the scientist to the imagina-

generalization of the artist, in addition to adding "religious depth to philosophical
tions. "

91

Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era (New York, 1934)

92 Ibid.

93

,

p. x.

of history
Hans Hofmann has offered a useful discussion of Niebuhr s philosophy
See Thn Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, o£_.
in Reflections on the End of an Era
T

.

cit,

,

pp. 68-88.

41

An adequate philosophy

of history

must ... be a

mythology rather than a philosophy .... A vision
of the whole is possible only if it is assumed that
human history has meaning; and modern empiricism
is afraid of that assumption. Meaning can be attributed to history only by a mythology. 9 ^

The problem with "modern empiricist" philosophies

were not aware of the mythology underlying

their

own

therefore unable to plumb the depths of history and
ly useful, a

of

meaning

mythology of history "must be able

momentary chaos.

in

And

"

yet,

of history

its

was

that they

interpretations, and

were

tragedy. 9 ^ To be genuine-

to do justice to the suggestions

even a philosophy of history based

upon mythology could not be
absolutely true in the sense that

it is

the only possible

But neither can it be
assumed that a science of history which disavows
mythology is more accurate in its description of the
interpretation of all the facts.

detailed facts. 9 ^

Niebuhr here bluntly announced his intention of finding meaning
through recourse

to

mythology

—

which

to

Niebuhr meant the supernatural. 97

Although he spoke of a "mythology of history,
his analysis as a philosophy of history.
that are held.

in history

" it is still

The point

appropriate to refer to

at issue is the presuppositions

All philosophies of history hold certain "givens" as the basis of
i

their meaning.

It is

obvious that, in 1934, Niebuhr was intent upon applying

supernatural insights to derive meaning from history.

94Reflections on the End of an Era
95 Ibid.
96

Ibid.

,

pp. 123-124.

,

p. 124.

,

pp. 122-123.

97 Hans Hofmann has argued that myth provides, for Niebuhr, the key to the underThe Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr op. cit., p. 73.)
standing of history.
(

,

42

With

tftfls

presupposition of Niebuhr's philosophy of history expressed

more systematically than
manner
1934

—

it

had been previously, we can now explore the

in

whidh he developed

its

ramifications.

—

with a vigor appropriate to his writing in

The justification for holding any philosophy

of history at all

was succinct-

expressed in this way;

ly

Interpretations of history actually tend to verify
tfcemselves, when rigorously held, because they
the course of history toward an imagined
inevitable goal. 98
cffirect

It

was thus not

This argument

;a

fts

hopeless pursuit to believe in a particular philosophy of history.

reminiscent of the "relevance of the impossible" (which

was not systematized

until the following year)

.

itself

There had been suggestions

earlier in Niefe^hr's writings that he saw justification for an "obviously" absurd
belief.

man

A

— yet

mythological philosophy of history was by definition absurd
it

wcrald,

"when rigorously

an "imagined inevitable goal,

held, " "direct the course of history toward

The rational man

an imagined inevitable goal."
"

based upon suparnaturalism.

to a rational

is

incapable of repudiating such

for his philosophy cannot analyze a goal when

it is

Rather, the "goal" can only be rejected, or excluded

from discussion.
Niebuhr devoted over ten pages

in this chapter to a

comparison

Augustinian, Jewish, and Marxist philosophies of history."

98

Refle ct ions

"ibid.

,,

oga the

End

pp. 124-136.

of a n

Era

,

p. 125.

The most

of

significant

43

was

similarity, according to Niebuhr,

apocalypse.

cism
key

In this respect,

the Marxist and Christian sense of an

Marxian thought was closer

that to Hellenistic interpretations of history.

to

man's

Contrary
self will

"in

to this,

Jewish religion there

is

The key

to

its

it-

confusions to order and

transcendence was spirit rather than reason.

to

However, "Christian orthodoxy,

was

reason was the

In the latter,

always the hope that history

be redeemed and that spirit will reduce

point that he

Jewish apocalypti-

and was the instrument by which history was transcended.

life,

harmony."

to

make repeatedly

"

according

to

—

Niebuhr

in his later writings,

and this

is

a

had followed the Greek

emphasis upon the transcendence of reason rather than the Jewish-prophetic
choice of the spirit.
If

one studied the thought of Jesus and the early church

dent that they

were "truer

spirit to nature, "

The

passage explains what

than the redemption of

man

This difficult concept

to plan his

is

is

upon reason.

becomes incapable

of

^"^See

,

p„ 133.

Human Nature

102 Reflections on the

,

pp. 4-12.

End

be redeemed. "102

It

is

is

possible for

man

to

use

applied to the whole of

encompassing the heights and depths

T

Ibid.

to

one that can be understood only by recourse

history s tragedy, and therefore reason cannot

1QQ

was

meant by the apocalypse: rather

own redemption. But when reason

history, that device

itself

of the

through reason, the end of history would redeem his-

to the spirit, rather than a reliance

reason

would be evi-

Jewish interpretation of the relation

and "lived by the hope that history

last part of this

tory itself.

to the

it

of an Era, p. 133.

redeem history

—

it

cannot give

of

44

meaning

to history.

The

spirit,

and the force of faith (even

if it

be "absurd"),

does have the necessary capacity.

The "genuine" Christian interpretation anticipated the end
an apocalypse, which was in the tradition of the prophets.

view of history (e.g.

,

of history as

The "liberal Christian"

as taught by John Dewey) did not interpret an "end" but

rather a steadily increasing growth of humanity

—

by means of reason

—

toward

The apocalypse was not necessary, for man, through reason,

the millennium.

would redeem himself.

Marxism foresaw

In contradistinction to this,

that the

"reason" employed was merely directed toward maintaining the prerogatives of
one class, and that class alone was heading toward
of

mankind

come,

to follow, the

own

Up

For the rest

utopia.

present civilization must be destroyed

words, an apocalypse.

in other

its

to this point, the

— there

must

Marxist philosophy

break came when, after

of history closely paralleled the prophetic vision, but the

the apocalypse, the Marxist vision predicted that the proletarian class would

assume the reins
tion of history

The redemp-

of leadership in the drive toward the millennium.

would again be

in the

hands of a human rather than a spiritual force.

Niebuhr, in his later writings, spelled out this "error" in the Marxist philosophy
of history

It

more

explicitly.

103

should not be assumed that Niebuhr intended

between spirit and nature (or
pretation of history to be
to

assure that

103 See

Human

man would
Destiny

,

faith

to

resolve the conflict

and reason) by pronouncing a spiritual inter-

more accurate. A

central

aim

of

Niebuhr

1

s

thought was

not feel justified in absolutizing any one vision of himself

pp. 86-87, and Faith and History

,

pp. 160-161.
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and his history.

Whatever absolute did

exist,

of history in order to be fully accepted by

would need

man.

to

wait until the end

Tension would remain as a safe-

guard against man's pride within history:

The tension between

and nature must remain
to the end of history lest the impulses of nature
clothe themselves with the moral prestige of the
spiritual and secure a moral immunity behind which
they express themselves without moral restraint.

The chapter
offers

some

"The Conflict Between Christianity and Communism"

entitled

insight into the

comparison

Niebuhr made an effort

history.

outlooks.

In like

communism

of

Marxist and prophetic philosophies of

to explain the differences

One important factor was

scientific base.

culture,"

spirit

that

manner with

between the two world

communism pretended

to arise

from a

the "irreligious naturalism of bourgeois

tried to invest history with purpose and meaning through a

scientific analysis of the "facts."

denied that this purpose has a
conscious author or that there is any revelation of
his intent in anything but the facts of history themselves, 105

In both cases

it

is

Thus, the communist and bourgeois philosophies were both naturalistic

in that

they denied any supernatural influence.

Niebuhr believed that the "actual contemporary facts of history,
"the

more pessimistic proletarian philosophy

1Q4Reflections on the End of an Era
1Q5

,

p. 136.

Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 193.

of history

much more

Cf. Faith and History

" justified

than the purely

,

pp. 212-215.

optimistic bourgeois view.
too absolute

—

rr

106
111

it

—

too certain

in its faith in the "scientific analysis" of history s "facts."
T

failed to understand that its view of history

sense

communism was

spite of this,

was based upon a

faith,

and

It

in this

was religious.
Nevertheless

confident faith, that good will grow out
of disaster, belongs definitely to the category of mythology
its

rather than science.

Both the bourgeois idea of progress
and the Marxian idea of salvation through catastrophe
express a faith in the character of life and history which
is religious rather than scientific. 107

Thus, one part of the problem with the Marxist philosophy was that
not recognize the non-scientific basis, or presupposition, of
Its

methodology was "scientific"

in itself

was

a

form

of religion.

in that it

It

it

did

methodology.

its

excluded the supernatural, but this

was Niebuhr's

belief that any

world-view that

found "the mechanisms of the cosmos either neutrally amenable, or profoundly

sympathetic to human ideals," was mythological and religious. 108 This was so

because
Since

one understood the universe, one had

if

man had "conquered"
There being no

to himself.

tory - i.e.

,

to

the universe he
scientific

—

in a

method

to

communism

did

—

it

was evident

that the

It

was not necessary

195.

—

to his his-

to

pre-

as neither bourgeois

But for one who probed underneath

system was indeed a religion, and
108

107
p.

relevant

because the devices of mechanism and rational-

to satisfy the naturalist.

the naturalistic cover,

,

it

it.

demonstrate the meaning of man within history, any system of

ism explained enough

Ibid.

conquered

show man's relevance

suppose a "conscious author" behind history's meaning

106

—

must therefore have made

thought that claimed to do this must be religious.

naturalism nor

sense

Ibid.

Ibid.

,

p. 196.
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therefore liable to criticism for not accepting or recognizing that fact.
In spite of this failure to accept themselves as

adequate

—

According

religiously

to

—

forms of religion, how

were bourgeois naturalism and proletarian communism?

Niebuhr, these two interpretations had elements of "irreligion"

them which weakened their
For a

ability to give

meaning

in

to history.

full -orbed religion not only interprets all

events in history in terms of an ultimate meaning,
but it also believes that this meaning and purpose

transcend any immediate event or fact

in historical

reality. 109

the M facts M

The mistake of those philosophies which relied only on

were helpless

to

escape the relativity of those facts

—

that they

they could not really

transcend history and could not therefore give true meaning

meaning

was

to life.

cannot have anything to do
with scientific adequacy because science cannot concern itself with the ultimate character and meaning
It

/the

of reality.

of life

J

HO

For Niebuhr, the "ultimate" meaning

of reality

was

to

be found through super-

natural guidance.

The reason

was

that

man was

that "ultimate" reality

was

the province of the supernatural

unable to escape the relativities of history sufficiently

to decide

upon an "ultimate."

The canons of logic and rationality are transcended
when reason attempts to comprehend the final
Ultimate world-views therefore seem more or less rational to given ages and
eras because they satisfy the temper of the day by
doing justice to those fa£ts which the age regards as
irrationality of things.

particularly important.

109

Ibid., p. 197.

11Q

Ibid.

,

pp. 197-198.

m

lbid., p. 198.
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The "irreligion"

meaning

that

in history

was imbedded

was

reasonable.

The idea

of finding

was the

-

pronounce

ultimate the vision of one particular

of this double-edged

attempts to find meaning in history
is

make

this effort to

The other side

historical era.

in the scientific attempts to

meaning

sword

—

i.e.

,

scientific

failure of reason to transcend what

in history

by escaping from

looking down from above directly contradicts the canons of reason.

it

and

If it is

de-

cided that meaning in history cannot be discovered by viewing the facts within
history, then the
al.

112

meaning must be found

or in the irration-

Bourgeois naturalism and proletarian communism were unprepared

with their reliance on "science"
If

we

—

to

continue with this logic

"ultimate reality" of the absurd.
of an

in the supernatural,

Era Niebuhr, for the

It

in order to defend his argument.

cope with the irrational.

—

as Niebuhr did

made ample use

Almost

become a theologian with unshielded

—

we must accept

is significant that in Reflections

first time,

—

the

on the End

of scriptural references

in spite of himself, he

was forced

to

theological suppositions.

never easy to relate the God of holiness
and perfection, conceived by the religious imagination,
with the actual facts of nature and history, an adequate
mythology never fails to commit the rational absurdity
of conceiving God as at once the pinnacle and the basis
of reality, the goal toward which life is striving and the
u
force by which it strives.

Though

it is

N. P. Jacobson, in an article based upon Human Destiny concluded that
"Niebuhr s philosophy of history is erected upon his concept of super-history
and that meaning is derived from that super -historical foundation. ("Niebuhr _s
Philosophy of History," The Harvard Theological Review 37 /October, 1944/,
,

,

f

T

,

241.)
'Reflections on the

End

of an Era, p. 200.

The "rational absurdity M had now become an integral part

God was the agent who assured

philosophy of history.

No further questioning was

reality itself.

for he

was both

of Niebuhr s
f

reality and

was also

God was an Absolute,

possible:

reality and the basis for reality.

In addition to this fact about God,

"beyond history.

M

He was an absolute

between God and

man?

that

was not subject

human history? What are

This

that

God was

to historical rela-

But a further problem arises: how can such

tivities or to scientific analysis.

a God have any relevance to

was also evident

it

is the

problem

the "points of contact"

that ultimately separates the

"believers" from the "non-believers," the naturalists from the supernatural ists.

On.e

may argue

that Niebuhr s analysis
T

the "rational absvirdity" of a

was adequate without introducing

God who actually made contact with history.

What would be wrong with a transcendent being who
history, and

who allowed

the world to operate

this belief one is at least not obligated to

Niebuhr s answer
T

to this

was

did not

much

as a

1 1

become involved

mechanism? With

show evidence for one

T

s faith.

that the active connection between

man

and God was vital to history:
/Christian theism/ is forced to insist upon this
connection lest, having solved the problem of life by
finding its centre of meaning, it lose the solution by
It

placing the centre so high above the realities of
nature and history that there are lost again in chaos

and mechanism.
114 Sidney Hook

made

this point

—

without answering

it

—

in a

review of

Reinhold Niebuhr: His
Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York, 1956). ( New York
Times Book Review /January 29, 1956/, p. 7.)

Charles

W. Kegley and Robert W.

Bretall, eds.
^

115 Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 200.

,

a

in

50

A

merely transcendent God would be inadequate for a philosophy

because

it

of history

would release man from any moral obligations within history.

God

must also be immanent:
Christian theism has solved this problem by its
conception of a transcendent-immanent God, a
conception which can never be fully rationalized
but which does justice both to the moral necessities
of

human

perience

life

and to the actual facts of human ex-

.... H6

Niebuhr was never able
erations within

human

history.

to separate his philosophy

He

is better

from

known as a teacher

ethical considof Applied

Christianity and Christian ethics than as a theologian or a philosopher.

This

major aspect

preach

of his thought

was evidently one force

that impelled

him

to

r

a transcendent-immanent God, rather than the somewhat less absurd transcend-

He recognized

ent God.

117
the loss in rational terms of this insistence. L±

This was also the point
of Karl Barth

1

at

which Niebuhr broke sharply with the theology

and the so-called Barthian School.

The Barthians wanted

separate completely the transcendent from the immanent God.

to

The argument

which they used was more logical and consistent than any which Niebuhr could

There was no rational way for the immanent God

muster.

to

escape the rela-

tivities of history, with the implication that the corruption of this

God would also

To avoid

stain the transcendent God.

this, the

immanent

Barthian School

postulated a transcendent God who was completely beyond the ebb and flow of

16 Ibid.

,

pp. 200-201.

117 Ibid.

,

p. 201.
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history.
in

This

is the

argument

Europe after Barth's Epistle
Niebuhr

T

s

spurred the renewal of Protestant theology

that

to the

Romans

118

in 1918,

criticism of these theologies was that they

cannot finally avail because in them religious pessimism
becomes too consistent and renounces the significance

and virtue of human history from the perspective of the
very ideal through which life has been saved from chaos
and meaninglessness.
Niebuhr could not understand the reason for endowing history with meaning
through a transcendent God, but then reducing history to chaos by renouncing
the

immanence

of God.

The paradox

in

Niebuhr

T

s

argument, is obvious:

he

developed the concept of a transcendent God by pleading the danger of a
philosophy of history subservient to the relativities of history.

transformed his transcendent God

man would have some

into a

transcendent-immanent God so that

basis for ethical action within the relativities of history. 120

Earlier in this section

it

was pointed out

that one part of the error of

Marxist philosophy of history was that the religious

— non-scientific —

presupposition of that philosophy was not recognized by
118

He then

its

proponents.

The

Donald B. Meyer has made the point that Niebuhr was far more influenced by
Paul Tillich j;han by Barth. ( The Protestant Search for Political Realism,
1919- 1941 /Berkeley, 1960/, pp. 272-273.) Tillich s book, The Interpreta tion of History was first published in English in 1936. For an appreciative
discussion by Niebuhr of Tillich' s book, see the last four pages of his article,
"The Contribution of Paul Tillich," Religion in Life 6 (Autumn, 1937), 574581. See also Tillich's short essay, "Sin and Grace in the Theology of
Reinhold Niebuhr, " in Harold R. Landon, ed. Reinhold Niebuhr: A Propheti c
Voice in Our Time (Greenwich, Conn., 1962).
1

,

,

,

119

Reflections on the End of an Era

120-p or

,

p. 202.

discussion of the significance of Niebuhr
nent God, see section 4 of this chapter.
fur ther

T

s

concept of an

imma-

other half of the error is that the end of history
lypse

—

is

the period after the apoca-

placed within history rather than beyond

remains subject
reached

—

end

its

to the relativities of history,

of history is therefore inaccurate

tory has not been understood.

It is

logical

—

meaning cannot be interpreted unless the end

man

way,

and history has therefore not

The meaning given

in a genuine apocalypse.

Marxian philosophy

In this

it.

history by the

because the end of his-

according
of

to

human

to

Niebuhr

—

that

history is accepted,

for otherwise there would be no assurance that the proposed meaning was not
a reflection of one particular historical era.

Niebuhr summarized the philosophies

munism,- and Christianity

of history of naturalism,

com-

in this way:

Judged by the criteria of optimism and pessimism
the difference between bourgeois naturalism, communism and classical Christianity is that the first
is purely optimistic because it finds ethical values
completely immanent in the processes of nature and
history. Communism is partially pessimistic because
it finds the historical process of the moment running
to its socio-moral ideal. But it is ultimately optimistic because it believes an organization of society
possible in which the chaos of egoistic impulse will
121
be fully overcome.

The optimism associated with prophetic Christianity
ing in history

—

is different

—

from other optimisms due

in the

to a

form

of a

mean-

more profound

Reflections on the End of an Era p 203. Donald B. Meyer reviewed
—
Niebuhr s analysis in this way: "All modern philosophies of history
—
whether evolutionary with the liberals, or catastrophic with Marxists
were mistaken in their belief that the possibilities of chaos and evil
,

0

1

could be progressively eliminated. "
Realism op. crL, p. 303.)
,

(

Protestant Search for Political

53

accompanying pessimism.
unable to

fulfill itself

This pessimism refers to the fact that history

- man

cannot

fulfill

is

himself, or alone attribute meaning

to his life.

Niebuhr concluded this important chapter by warning against the perfectionism associated with "liberal Christianity."
developing emphasis upon

man

highest good accomplished by

T

There

s inevitable sinfulness

man

is also replete

is a

and the fact that the

with the potentiality for the

highest evil due to the "egoistic impulse" of sinful man. 122
that helps to

make

suggestion of his

It is

this fact

a transcendent God necessary, contrary to the hopes of

liberal Christianity which denies

man's inevitable sinfulness.

4.

A

sequentially the last in the book

When Niebuhr decided
the

—

third significant chapter in Reflections on the End of an Era

problem

that an

—

"The Assurance of Grace."

immanent God was necessary

of "points of contact"

How was man "assured"

is that entitled

that this

between this God and

for

human

man became

God was immanent? How was

history,

important,

his grace

manifest within history?
122
12

Reflections on the

End

of an

Era

,

p. 204.

N. P. Jacobson, a religious naturalist, attempted to give an account of the
"empirical data" that Niebuhr supposedly used to "demonstrate the pull of
the transcendent upon man. " ("Niebuhr s Philosophy of History, " oj). cit.
241-245.) Jacobson misses the point when he tries to analyze Niebuhr'
evidence, for he applies a rational method of criticism to prophetic preT

suppositions.

,

54

Niebuhr recognized the "tension" that existed when
man both lived
nature and was aware of the possibility of the reality
of the spirit.

It

was

in

to

be hoped that this spirit, this "religion of grace," would
"console the human
spirit to its inevitable defeat in the

world of nature and history.

" 124

In addi-

tion to serving as a spiritual

balm

would also encourage man

maintain a degree of morality within the rela-

tivities of history. 125

to

for man's tensions, this "pure religion"

(This latter purpose is the argument for an immanent

God which was pointed out

in the

previous section.)

Niebuhr s philosophy of history now became more theological, as he
T

attempted to demonstrate the validity of the immanent God. 126 His argument
also

became more obscure

interpreted

human

—

at least

from

the vantage point of analysis.

history as evidence of both grace and judgment.

sumably correlates with the two-fold nature

Only a transcendent God could act as a

transcendent.
of

man's

12 4

9fi

"every

life

,

This pre-

immanent and

final judge, and,

because

deserves destruction." 127 When Niebuhr wrote that

Reflections on the End of an Era

125 Ibid.
1

sin,

of God, as both

He

p. 279.

,

p. 280.

Hans Hofmann

felt

assured, in following Niebuhr s increasingly theological
T

language, to speak of his "theological" interpretations of history. The
Christ-event, upon which we will soon elaborate, was the key, for
"reflection upon the Christ -event
(is/ the basis of the understanding
.

of history."

(

The Theology

8

.

of Reinhold Niebuhr

,

op. cit.

,

p. 119.)

Hofmann went on to suggest that, for Niebuhr, theology and the interpretation of history were closely inter-related, since the Christ-event was
central to both. Niebuhr could not speak either of theology or of history
without reference to the other, yet he did, according to Hofmann, keep them
separate.* ( The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr Ibid. p. 204.)
,

127 Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 286.

,

55

"the facts of history lend themselves both to cynical and to religious inter-

pretations, " 128 he
of

A

God

must have meant

is liable to contribute to

that a wholly transcendent interpretation

cynicism

in

man's

toward his history.

attitude

transcendent -immanent interpretation, by contrast, assured grace as well

as judgment.

The problem remained

—

answer

which he elaborated

of

how

to

demonstrate

in this chapter

The religious imagination sees

—

was

T

s

this:

when

truly

Niebuhr

this grace.

it

regards

the slow processes of history and the impartialities of
nature as revelations of divine mercy. 1^9

Grace

—

the proof of the

immanent God

—

was evident

to those

possessed with

the "religious imagination."

Niebuhr understood that
manifestations

— were

faith alone

was not enough.

"Symbols"

—

needed.

Religious faith needs specific symbols; and the Jesus
of history is a perfect symbol of the absolute in history because the perfect love to which pure spirit
aspires is vividly realized in the drama of his life
and cross. Thus a man becomes the symbol of God and
the religious sense that the absolute invades the relative and the historical is adequately expressed.

Throughout Niebuhr

T

s writing, the

symbol for the immanency
128 Ibid.
129

Jesus of history was

of God. 131

Niebuhr

f

to

be the most adequate

s Christology is

an important,

286

,

p.

,

p. 287.

Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 In contrast, D. R. Davies interpreted Niebuhr s concept of the Last Judgment
as dominant in his philosophy of history. Davies is correct insofar as philoso
phy of history is confined to a study of the meaning of history. ( Reinhold
Niebuhr: Prophet from America /New York, 1945/, pp. 53-54, and 65.)
T

and sometimes overlooked, element
life

in his theology. 132

The drama

of Jesus

provided the perfect symbol: the absolute within the relative, and
the

lesson of love by which grace was available to man.

more

fully the

meaning

of this "sacrificial love" (agape) in contrast to "mutual

love, " which is not without a degree of

by means of agape
love in history.

made, and God

,

Niebuhr later expressed

human egoism. 133 Grace

is

tendered

and the cross represents, through Christ, the proof of this

Thus, the important point of contact between God and man
is

shown

to

is

be immanent.

Although Niebuhr accepted Jesus as the "perfect symbol" of the

nency of God, he was not blind

to the fears of "liberal

the symbol of Jesus to be imperfect since

was

it

Christians," who

historical.

It

immafelt

involved "a

man

living in Galilee and speaking the language of a particular time and place." 134

If

this criticism

were granted, Niebuhr

felt, the

absolute to history" would be unduly complicated.

would not be available

to the

human

spirit.

A

task of "relating the

spiritual

balm

(grace)

A "balm" was needed which demon-

strated not only that faith and history were in conflict, but also that there was

"some ultimate resolution and reconciliation
over Jesus* existence

in the conflict. " 13 ^

in a particular historical

The argument

period versus his claim

to

transcendence over history weakened the claim for the immanency of God.
132 See Paul Lehmann, "The Christology of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Charles
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds., Reinhold Niebu hr, op. cit.

133 See

Human

Destiny

,

pp. 70-97.

134Reflections on the End of an Era
135

Ibid.

,

p. 287.

W.
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The long controversy about the two natures

of

Christ in the history of Christian theology represents the futile effort of reason to comprehend or
to define the mythological absurdities and profundities of the original

myth.

"Reason," says Niebuhr, cannot comprehend the truth of Jesus' transcendent
character.

The symbol

is a

"mythological absurdity," yet

next question to be asked is why this particular event

—

The

profound.

it is

the Christ-event

—

is

accepted as the significant "mythological absurdity."

The

dialectical theology of the Barthian School recognized the difficulty

of this question,

made

and therefore

lifted the Christ-event itself out of history

not a symbol of God's immanence, with

it

all of the

and

"mythological

absurdity" thereby implied, but the single intervention by God into history.

The incarnation did not demonstrate God's immanence but rather
venture into history to expose the Truth to the witness of man.

his single

God remained

a completely transcendent being.

Niebuhr 's disagreement with this thinking was definite.

He

felt that

such an interpretation could find
no meaning in history or nature except as the one
event in history (the incarnation) illumines the
scene. It is significant too that this one event in
history really ceases to be an event in history and
that the symbol of the absolute never really becomes
incarnate.

136
137

Ibid.

Cf.

,

p. 288.

Donald B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism

pp. 248-249.

l38

Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 289.

,

og> cit.

,

Niebuhr would not accept an interpretation
did not justify the

immanence

of the "perfect

of God.

Niebuhr was also unhappy with the interpretation
given by liberal Christianity.

pessimism"

symbol" which

of the Christ-event

In contrast to the "consistent

of dialectical theology, liberal Christianity

dualism and

seemed

to offer "a

plausible rationalism. n 139

more

believes that the Jesus of history was a symbol of
the absolute because he personifies the highest human
values.
The goodness of human nature and finally the
ethical character of history itself are thus the revelaIt

T

T

tions of the absolute.

If

this

seems more plausible and

rational to our day than the position of Christian

orthodoxy

because our culture has been an
optimistic one and it has not realized what frustrations
and defeats the spirit meets in the impulse of history
and nature. 140

There

is, in this

it

is only

passage, an almost sarcastic epitomisation of the liberal

Christian attempt to identify relative
absolute ethics of Jesus.
of

human nature and

which the human spirit

know
is

of

goodness with the

logical that one should identify one's

ethical codes with an absolute.

the force of logic does not
to

It is

human concepts

In

own image

an optimistic culture,

the illogical depths and insoluble frustrations

exposed.

The attempt

to transfer the relative

ethics (and optimism) of one historical era to the absolute of the Christ-event
is to

destroy the meaning of that event, and to delude those who accept

revelatory nature.

140 Ibid.

its
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Niebuhr's complaint against dialectical theology was that

it

separated

so completely "the absolute and the relative, the divine and the
human, the
spiritual and the natural, " that

the ultimate faith of religion in the meaningfulness
of life rests upon one event in history which is not

truly historical.

Religion

is

The problem with liberal Christianity was
nature" was not recognized.
nature (including

The result

human nature)"

thus reduced to magic. 141
that the "tension between spirit and

of this failure

v/as "invested

was

that "all history and

prematurely with the aura of the

absolute and the perfect. "

cases rationalism has destroyed the original
mythological profundity of the Christian religion
which sought to express the idea that the conflict
between spirit and nature is a real conflict, that no
complete victory of spirit in history is possible, but
that defeat is turned into victory when the unachieved
perfection is discovered to be a forgiving love which
In both

justifies (understands)

The

last point, about

"pessimism"

in

regard

man's imperfection. 1^2

"man's imperfection,"

to his philosophy of history.

is a

key

to

Rationalism as

by both dialectical theologians and liberal theologians could not
account of man's sin.

Niebuhr's
it

is

fully take

The tension by which man both created and destroyed

was snapped.

When

put in rational terms this experience /of Grace/
means that the man who is involved in the relativities of

the natural and historical process finds himself nevertheless in contact with the final and the absolute life

above the process. Thus the tension between
14
the absolute and the relative is overcome.

which

is

**

141

ibid.

used

Ibid.

,

p. 290.

143

Ibid.

It

is possible to put in rational

terms the relationship between the relative and

the absolute, and thus release the tension.

But the rationalization of the mythos robs it of some
of its significance. In purely rational terms the sin
of man becomes merely the imperfection and relativity inherent in the process of history and the sense
of personal responsibility for evil actions is lost. * 44

The problem with the

dialectical and liberal theologies

away the tension between man's existence within the
his

awareness of the absolute which

cept of sin

to rationalize the

and

man

is left with

For

this

reason the con-

himself justified.

mythological absurdity must be re-

Otherwise the effort

sisted, says Niebuhr.

felt

that they rationalized

relativities of history and

beyond history.

was blunted, and imperfect man

The inclination

in vain,

is

was

to postulate a

transcendent God

no moral rudder by which to guide his

life

is

through

the relativities of history.

The experience

of grace, in short, can only be expressed

terms if it is not to become a peril to the
ethical life. For only in the concepts of religious myth
can an imperfect world mirror the purposes of a divine
Creator and can the mercy of God make the fact of sin
and imperfection bearable without destroying moral
in mythological

responsibility for the evil of imperfection or obscuring
145
its realities in actual history.

A

central fact that the

modern era

did not realize

was

that evil could not be

eliminated.

The "points

of contact*' between

man and

therefore, an accumulation of historical events.
in 1934

144 Ibid.

—
,

enumerate such a
pp. 290-291.

list,

an immanent God were not,
At least Niebuhr did not

which would have been comparable
l45 Ibid.

,

p. 292.

146 Ibid.

—

to a list

,

pp. 293-294.

61

of "miracles," such as those expounded by various
religions, including

Catholicism.

Niebuhr made explicit only the one historical event

The other signs

of

God

T

s

immanency were

to

completely than the semi -historical Christ-event.

was

the nature of the self.

Roman

of Christ.

be taken on faith even more

The important factor here

The ego must recognize

"that the blind forces of

nature which frustrate the spirit are in the self as well as outside it." 147
The
suggestion from "classical Christianity" that "repentance

redemption," and even that
.

.

insight.

148

This

is

"it is

is the

sj'nonymous with redemption"

beginning of
is a

profound

so because

the evils and frustrations of life and history would be,
in fact, unbearable if contrition did not reduce the pre-

sumptions and pretensions of the self and reveal the
fact that some of the confusions from which the spirit
suffers have their direct source in the chaos of the
self and that others may be regarded as punishment
for the sins of the self even if they have not been
obviously caused by them. 149

The burden

of

man's

sin lies heavily in Niebuhr s philosophy of history.
T

In this theological concept, the

tory was sealed.

aware

Man

redemption from

man must show

and

in the

147 Ibid.,

when man

company

p. 295.

of a

is

redeemed he

God who

is also

it.

In

order

to initiate the

The redemptive process

repentance.

between the immanent God and man, and
ent God, since

in his-

feels the frustration of his life in history because he is

of the possibility of

tive process,

bond between man and the God immanent

it is

is

is the link

also connected with the transcend-

beyond the relativities of history

beyond those relativities,

148 Ibid.

redemp-

i.e.

149 Ibid.

,

a

transcendent God.

Thus, there

is a close

connection between the immanent

and transcendent God, and we are justified
transcendent God (paradoxical as that

When man shows
is that

man

is

speaking of an immanent-

in

may seem)

repentance, he demonstrates two things.

The

first

admitting that he has sinned, and shows the necessary contrition.

The second evident

fact is that

man

Man has recognized

nency of God.

by himself participating

has made real, through

faith, the

imma-

the "mythological absurdity" as a reality

in irrationality, i.e.

,

by showing repentance for sins

of which he is not aware, and demonstrating contrition toward a force that is
rationally absurd.
It is

the

by participating

immanency

of God.

accepted through

faith.

in a rational absurdity that

Grace

—

the contact between

Whether or not

it

by which Niebuhr finds meaning

in history.

which Niebuhr offers

immanency

of this

God through repentance)

is a

is

made aware

God and man

this proof satisfies those

willing to extend their faith to that point,

is that the

man

is

true that

it

God

(plus

must be

who are not

clarifies the process

The most convincing
of

—

justification

man's acknowledgment

profound judgment upon the human situation.

Both the heights and the depths of the world of spirit are
known. The knowledge of the depths within the self saves
from pride, prevents a bitter criticism of the sins of
others and makes a sullen rebellion against the imperfections of nature and history impossible; the knowledge
of the heights keeps profound self-knowledge from
degenerating into bitter disillusionment.

Ibid.

of

The act

of repentance,

and the acceptance of grace does two things.

real the existence of the immanent God, and
analysis of the self.

it

makes possible

the self which acts in history;

It is

it

It

makes

a profound

is the

immanent-

transcendent God which gives meaning to history, and which therefore serves
as the basis for a philosophy of history.

This analytic step from

man

God

to

is of

Niebuhr' s systematic philosophy of history.
of

If

God

for history, he

he were not able

to

have made no sense.
by which

was unable

In

Each philosophy
"meaning.

"

of history

is the fact that

may be

It

of

is

may

that "reason"

is

meaningless

placed on events within history

"meaning" cannot be understood by man.

tation has still confronted the

meaning

in_ history.

problem

of

meaning

would

utilize a different crutch

shows history

millennium on earth, or

shows that human history

each case a meaning

meaning

in

in history, his philosophy of history

moving progressively toward some type
dialectical theology

Until he had explained the

to justify his contention of

show meaning

to give history

fundamental importance

—

that

in its relativity.

even

if

meaning

that

For such an interpre-

in history,

and has organized

a philosophy of history based upon its analysis of the problem of history s
T

meaning.

Niebuhr, in 1934, had clearly shown that he interpreted the meaning

of history by

means

of the reality of an

immanent-transcendent God.

5.

There are,

in Reflections

on the End of an Era

for understanding Niebuhr s philosophy of history.
f

,

other chapters valuable

The opening chapter,

64

"The Life and Death of Civilization,

TT

concerned with man's

is

evaluate properly his position in history.
the relative nature of his

"mechanisms.

Modern man has

inability to

failed to recognize

"

Mechanism easily veils the actual realities of life.
It makes human life seem to be a series of highly
rational social relationships and hides the fact that
these relations are actually the product, not of mind
and conscience but of power and impulse. 151

Modern man does not realize
into

that his "will -to-live" is easily "transmuted"

"an imperial will-to-power." Man's will-to-live, his effort to escape

mortality, creates the danger of man's attempt to absolutize, by means of

power, his own historical position.

The result

a tangle of power which is driven by impulse.
is a

This

But the "realities" of human

mechanism.

absolutize his

is that

own

life

human

is a rational

are that

man

historical era, or his position within that era.

process
is

—

unable

He

is

own destiny

modern man cast

a veil over this reality, for

man can

only

fulfill

it

to

not

The "mechanistic" assumptions

able to fulfill his

in history.

becomes

history

of

himself with

the aid of a non -rational resource.

The problem with depending upon reason alone within history
limitations of that device are not fully realized.

is

overrated by modern man.

Its ability to

is that the

control "impulse"

Reason frequently "provides rationalization

152 Man's impulses
rather than restraints for the play of egoistic impulse."

cannot be totally controlled by reason, because the self issues forth both

reason and impulse.
by their

common

151 Ibid., p. 4.

The two are not separate

entities but are

origin in the self.
152 Ibid., p. 5.

bonded together

Reason

is

(impulse) -to-live.
live through the

vent

prostituted to self-seeking motives because of man's will

A

person

will "universalize" himself

use of reason, and will direct

him from working

it

and his own will -to-

against those who would pre-

his will.

Reason may,
strategies:

in short, result in two conflicting

the strategy of universalizing a par-

form of life by seeking to subject all
competing forms of itself, and the strategy of
subjecting all particular forms of life to the

ticular

universal.

Driven

to its logical conclusion the

latter strategy ends in the impulse of all high

religion to subordinate every specific form of
life to life in its

The unmitigated force
quences

in

human

more

absolute form to God.

of reason is not, therefore, without disastrous conse-

history.

Since reason must of necessity function within the

self, it is subject to the evil

tendencies inherent in the self, and occasionally

serves as merely a rationalization for man

argument

is that since,

T

s

impulse.

The converse

by observing the facts of history, we detect Instances

where reason served as a rationalization for impulses, we are
assuming

that the locus of

man's reason

Niebuhr

T

s

sin is not elaborated in this book,

philosophy of history

upon the ultimate efficacy

is

evident

of reason,

does not utilize reason as a base.
153 Ibid.
154
155

Ibid.

See

,

p. 6.

,

p. 7.

Human

(the self)

The suggestion

the best intentions of "reason."

man's original

of this

Nature, chapters 7-9

from

is

justified in

capable of evil despite

of a systematic

but

its

the fact that

argument for

importance for
it

casts doubt

and that Niebuhr's philosophy of history

66

Niebuhr's pessimism concerning man's use of reason
was not a small
matter.

He was convinced

of vast importance.

through reason.

that the force of

human "impulse

There could be no complete mitigation

The tension between the forces

11

of

in history

man's impulse

of reason and of impulse could

not be resolved for they were inherent in the make-up of the self.
self,

reason was torn apart by egoistic considerations.

Within the

The result could not

but be something far less than an impartial force working

man would

was

in

history.

Either

denigrate his own individual rights by over-compensating for his

ego, or he would fail to appreciate the egoistic element involved in any decision

based upon "reason.

M

The tension could not be resolved.

No

stable equilibrium is ever reached in history
between the two impulses: the impulse to subject
the individual or social ego to the universal even to
the point of self-annihilation or absorption and the

impulse

of destroying or enslaving all
life.

It is

^6

significant that the first part of this opening chapter in Reflections

on the End of an Era
(in his

is

even to the point
competing forms of

to universalize the ego

,

in

which Niebuhr analyzes "reason,"

is the first

books) in which a strictly logical method of argument is employed.

a discourse elevated above most of that found in the earlier Moral

Immoral Society

,

and

in it

M an

It

and

one can recognize Niebuhr s concern to make his

philosophy more systematic.

T

The

first part of this chapter thus sets the tone

for that writing in the book which deals with philosophy of history.

156

essay

Reflections on the End of an Era, p.

9.

67

A major argument
between "spirit

11

of this

volume was

that there

was

a sharp distinction

and "nature." 157 By this Niebuhr meant that nature (or

reason) could not alone deal with man's problems, and that the "spirit" was

necessary.

The

in life.

This

to

true because the spirit is the source of the ethical force

spirit should not be rationalized

realm of nature

man

is

—

—

brought completely into the

because this would dissipate some

imagine that he has gained control over

of its force

by allowing

this particular factor.

a realization would eliminate the tension within the self and allow

man

Such
to pride

himself for being in complete control of his destiny.

The results

of this, according to Niebuhr, would be disastrous.

The

failure to understand that reason would be used to justify impulse "was a fatal

mistake because

it

permitted a more unrestrained expression of impulse than

ever before in history."

misunderstood

Niebuhr concluded with a dynamic (and sometimes

attack upon man's

supreme

faith in reason:

The wise men of our era did not realize at all that
mind is the servant of impulse before it becomes its
master and that the first effect of mind upon impulse
is to make man more deadly in his lusts than the
Impulses always express themselves in welldefined limits in nature .... But in man reason
bursts the bonds and limits which nature sets upon
her own impulses. Man's higher degree of selfconsciousness and egocentricity transmutes the
brute.

brute's will -to -survive into the
power. 160

157 Ibid.

,

p. 9, esp. fn.

158 Ibid.

,

p. 16.

159

human

will-to-

See Holtan P. Odegard, Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as Political
Theologian (Yellow Springs, Ohio), passim.

160 Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 17-

It

should be recognized that Niebuhr wrote
this

and
this

at a

time when he

felt that

in the

heart of the Depression,

a eivilization was reaching

its

end.

Although

serves to explain a part of the disdain he
showed toward man's rational

faculties, a

more important

fact is that this element of his thought
retained a

vital role in his philosophy of history.

6.

The remaining sixteen chapters
of less

in Reflections

on the End of an Era are

importance for Niebuhr's philosophy of history, but are worth
consider-

ing, especially since they

underscore some of the points already considered.

Perhaps the most consistent strain

in this

against a too complete reliance upon reason.

book

warning given

is the

Although reason

is

not identified

with nature, Niebuhr charges that the force of reason is often used to rationalize
the irrational impulses of

man's nature.

Because of

this,

Niebuhr can make the

following statement:

Our optimistic

rationalists fail to recognize that

the collective enterprises of

man

order of nature much more than
reason. -^1

The sin

of the self,

which consisted of the failure

use of reason because of

more dangerous

in,

its

it

a

161 Ibid.

,

collective

man.

This argument

Man and Immoral

more systematic statement
p. 31.

to recognize the imperfect

connection with egoism,

sented two years earlier in Moral

gave

belong to the
to the order of

in Reflections

is also attributed to,

is the

same

Society

,

and

as that pre-

except that Niebuhr

on the End of an Era

.

The

69

theme, however, remained the same:

The wise men who see the

logic of history so plainly

always live under the illusion that the men of power
can finally be persuaded to see what they see. They
suffer

from

this illusion

because they do not realize
how much the collective life of man moves by impulse
rather than by reason. 162
Niebuhr saw no justification for the belief that larger communities would bring
"the impulses of nature under an adequate rational and

moral scrutiny and

avert the deadly vengeance of history upon predatory life." 163 People who
believed this live, he argued,

under the illusion that life, including collective life,
can be made fully rational and moral. They have not
yet seen with what stubborn inertia life-as-impulse
defies the obvious imperatives of lif e -as -spirit.

Those "imperatives" of
which would help

spirit included a recognition of

to fail

spirit.

and an

Other analyses were

due to a lack of awareness for the heights and depths of the human

was with

It

sinfulness,

to solve the blindness of the faith given to reason,

acceptance of the immanent God by means of contrition.

bound

human

this confidence that

Niebuhr could write that

moralistic interpretations of history are mistaken.

"

^5

"all

purely

Pure moralism could

not account for the failure of reason to solve the problem of history s meaning.
1

Niebuhr was especially critical of the social sciences,
to foster a

in their attempt

philosophy of history based upon "reality."

162 Ibid.

,

p. 34.

165 Ibid.

,

p. 32.

163

164
Ibid.

,

p. 35.

Ibid.

70

Sociologists,

whose special business

it is to study
the realities of social life, seem to be particularly
obtuse in dealing with the profounder and more
tragic aspects of human history. 166

The prejudices

ism

-

optimism, rationalism, and individual-

were made the basis for a philosophy

to the doleful realities of

basis for
is its

-

of the liberal tradition

all of the

human

life.

M !67

of history

According

errors of liberalism /including

erroneous estimate of human nature.

" 168

to

its

By

which failed

TT

to do justice

Niebuhr, the "real

philosophy of history/

statement he meant

this

that liberal philosophy of history did not appreciate the egoistic impulses within

the self which result in the corruption of "pure reason, " and thereby define

man

T

sin.

It

was not only

in his discussion of the

errors of liberalism that Niebuhr

offered general statements about the nature of history.

"general historical logic" that was not followed due
interference. 169

predatory

life. "

S p 0 k e of history as

jj e

1^0

n e was concerned

in

human

history.

to

that evil in history could not be destroyed

of

themselves a portion of the

good destroy evil cannot help but
evil, thus

of

good and

evil is

prominent

reason for this was his feeling that liberal visions
understand the permanence of human

,

p. 46.

169 Ibid.

,

p. 77.

(egoistic)

perpetuating that force

171

The problem

166lbid.

to nationalistic

of a

passing "negative judgment upon

because the instruments by which the forces
have transferred

He could speak

167 Ibid.
17Q

Ibid.

in Niebuhr' s thought.

One

of history did not adequately

evil.

,

pp. 46-48.

168 Ibid.

,

p. 51.

171 Ibid., p. 94.

,

p. 48

"

s

71

The processes

rough to make a
precise discrimination between good and evil possible.
A civilization which has outlived its usefulness is
destroyed in spite of its virtues. That is what makes
the realities of history so outrageous to moralists and
why they always insist that future history must be more
of history are too

refined than that of the past.

According

to

Niebuhr

,

the liberal -moralistic view could not accept the realities

of history which included the failure of good to win complete victory over evil.

Neither

communism nor

capitalism understood the "complexities of history"

well enough to justify their "over-simplified abstractions. "

marily simply another way of saying that a philosophy
both the heights and depths of the

have

—

and always will have

—

human

spirit,

^3

of history

This

is pri-

must appreciate

and must realize that

the capacity for both good and evil.

all

men

This

"adequate view of human nature" and of man's place in history was possible
only in a religion which did not

"mechanism")

bow before reason

(or

modern

society's

^

1 74.

The co-existence

of

good and

evil in history

was a constantly stressed

point in this book, and all of those which followed.

The moral

logic of history is never pure and

dispassionate precisely because judgment upon
evil cannot be executed without stiffening the spirit
175
of justice with an alloy of the spirit of vengeance.

172 Ibid.

,

p. 87.

173 ibid.

,

p. 88.

,

pp. 113-114.

174
175

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 139.

Cf.

Beyond Tragedy

,

p. 161;

and

Human

Nature, pp. 12-18

Although the "executors of judgment in history" mix "the hope for a
city of

God" with their more
higher good"

is

lustful

and egoistic activities, progress "toward the

made upon "very

tortuous routes and

sometimes cruelly disappointed." 176 From

ideal are

obvious that "history never moves, even
line. "

177

Further,

dictum that good

is

is

it

evident that

most cruel when he

his

own

the

dreams

this analysis,

to its inevitable goals,

man

is

of the

it is

on a straight

most inhuman when he denies

the

suffused with evil, and "imagines his natural impulses and

his relative values to be the instruments of

assumes

...

is

unaware

some

of his cruelty,

absolute good. " 178

and this

is the

Man

is

case when he

that he foresees a "straight line" through history, and thus absolutizes

This "yearning after the absolute" was a

relative position in history.

"weakness

human imagination"

of the

tinue throughout

human

history. 179

that,

according

to

Niebuhr, would con-

This kind of pessimism was generally

tempered, however, with expressions of hope.

When

the hard realities of history have once again
dissipated the Utopian dreams of the present the

emphasis of classical religion upon the experience
of grace will find its way back again into the moral
and religious life of the race. 180

The above passage amply demonstrates
philosophy of history as

17 6 Reflections on the
17 7 Ibid.

,

p. 148

l^Ibid.

,

p. 171.

l 7 9 lbid.

,

p.

180 lbid.

,

p. 275.

185.

it

End

had developed

of an

Era

,

the nature of Reinhold Niebuhr s

in 1934.

p. 140.

T

Theological terminology and

73

symbolism had replaced the rational schema
interpretations of history.

much preoccupied

of "liberal"

Another significant point

and "philosophical"

is that

Niebuhr was as

with criticizing other philosophies of history as he was with

building one of his own.

This trait remained with him even in the most system-

atic presentations of his

own philosophy

a nd Histor y.

It

is,

of history in

Human

Destiny and Faith

therefore, perhaps fair to view Niebuhr s philosophy of
T

history as a product of his struggle against the "errors" of the modern era.

The

fact that his first systematic treatment of the

appeared

in

£ book

of "reflections on the

problem

end of an era"

of

meaning

is revealing.

in history

Witness-

ing the "end of an era" dedicated to one philosophy of history, Niebuhr felt

impelled to search for a "new" one.

74

VI

THE MIDDLE

In 1935 Reinhold

(PART

1930 S
T

2)

Niebuhr published a book entitled An Interpretation

of

Christian Ethic s. ±ox Although by 1956 he reported that he was neither able to

defend nor interested in defending his position in
Ethics, 182 the book is an important

work

been, and continue to be, one of Niebuhr

T

if

s

combine

Interpretation of Christian

only for the fact that ethics have

prime concerns.

Moral Man and Immoral Society was "A Study
this attempt to

An

in Ethics

political action with ethical

The

subtitle for

and Politics," and

judgment remained for

Niebuhr a valid function for religion.

An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics does not, however, contribute

significantly to Niebuhr s philosophy of history.
T

What

it

does discuss had

already been elaborated in greater detail in Reflections on the End of an Era

An example

of this is the

comments concerning

the transcendency and

.

imma-

nency of God. 183 He discussed the corruption of the mythical symbols by a
single-minded belief

in a

181 Reinhold Niebuhr,

An

transcendent God.

This was the result of an attempt

Inter pretation of Christian Ethics

(New York, 1935;

Cleveland, 1956).
182 Charles

W. Kegley and Robert W.

Bretall, eds.

,

pp. 434-435.

183

An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

,

pp. 18-20.

Reinhold Niebuhr

,

o£. eit
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symbols. 184 He praised the catastrophic aspect

to rationalize the

philosophy of history, but criticized

its

of the

Marxian

utopianism. 18 5 Niebuhr spoke of

Judeo-Christian religion (prophetic religion), and

its ability to

maintain the

tension between the real and the ideal, with the ideal transcending "every
historical fact and reality. "

Niebuhr

did, in

"myth of creation"
184 Ibid.

,

185 Ibid.

,

186
187

rbid.

,

An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

,

introduce the

into his philosophy of history: 187

pp. 20-21.
pp"

25-26.

pp. 27-28.

This paper has not emphasized systematically Niebuhr s treatment of
"myth." Rudolf Bultmann s work on New Testament "mythology" is
better known than that of Niebuhr. However, the latter does not wholly
accept Bultmann's interpretation. (For a comparison of Bultmann's
and Niebuhr s interpretation of myth see Hans Hoffmann, The Theology
of Reinhold Niebuhr, op cit. pp. 68-88.) This subject is expansive —
especially as related to philosophy of history. Of special value is
Niebuhr s article, "The Truth in Myths," in The Nature of Religious
Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh (New York,
1937). See also Macintosh's attack upon Niebuhr s interpretation of
myth, in which he traces Niebuhr s enchantment with mythology from
Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic ("Is Theology Reducible
to Mythology?" The Review of Religion 4 /January, 19407, 140-158.)
Niebuhr s reply is in The Review of Religion 4 (March, 1940), 304-308;
and Macintosh s rejoinder was published in May, 1940, pages 434-437.
Edward J, Carnell also traces Niebuhr s appreciation of myth to the
Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic ( The Theology of
Reinhold Niebuhr /Grand Rapids, 1950/, p. 113, note 42.)
T

T

T

.

,

T

T

T

.

,

T

,

T

1

.
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The myth

of creation offers

.

.

.

the firm foundation

for a world view which sees the Transcendent involved
in, but not identified with, the process of history. It

important to realize that the myth of creation is
only the basis of this dialectic and that its further
is

elaboration results in the prophetic or apocalyptic
characteristic of this religion, marked by its hope
for an ultimate fulfillment of meaning and its faith
that the God who is the ground of existence is also
the guarantor of its fulfillment. 188

But there are no significant additions in this passage to those thoughts found in
Reflections on the End of an Era

eager

to

It is

.

important, however, that Niebuhr was

emphasize the fact that he proposed a "genuinely prophetic religion."

Prophetism defines much
"redemption

is

of his philosophy of history.

never, as in rational and mystical religion, above the realm of

living history, but within and at the end of

it.

Tragedy, the problem of redemption within,

was

to

In a prophetic religion,

receive systematic discussion. 90

a

n 189

Two years

at the

end

of,

later, in

Beyond

or "beyond" history

suggestion of this was given in

1935 when Niebuhr stated that "the eschatology of Jesus, though this-worldly
in

framework, went beyond the possibilities

of natural existence. " 191
«-

This "clue" to a deepening consideration in Niebuhr
history received

some further expression

"meaninglessness of
l 88

An

life" to a "faith in the final unity."

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

189 Ibid.

,

in this book.

,

p. 29

p. 35.

190

See Beyond Trage dy, chapter

191

An

1,

esp. p. 22.

Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 37

T

s

philosophy of

Niebuhr related the

The

"final unity"

transcended the "world's chaos," yet was "basic
This

nothing

is

more

statements in the light of Niebuhr's interest

in eschatology, for the nature of

history's end.

world's order." 192

than a restatement of the transcendency and immanency

may read such

But we

of God.

to the

God forms the basis for

The relationships between the dual nature

the interpretation of
of

God on the one

hand, and the culmination of history on the other, can be followed in this

passage:

N

Placing the final fulfillment at the end of time and
not in the realm above temporality is to remain true
to the genius of prophetic religion and to state
mythologically what cannot be stated rationally. If
stated rationally the world is divided between the
temporal and the eternal and only the eternal forms
above the flux of temporality have significance. 19 3

The case for the immanency of God
This end

history.

apocalypse.
if

is not to

is

here placed

in the context of the

be "above temporality,

The importance

of an

immanent God

" but is to

is

end of

be a genuine

powerfully evident now:

history culminates within itself, and God is merely transcendent, then

redemption

is

impossible.

Prophetic religion understands this and states the

"reality" mythologically, whereas rational interpretations fail to see the con-

nection between the apocalypse and the "rationally absurd" immanent God.

The logic

of Niebuhr's

argument must be accepted

if

we are

stand why he places the source of history's meaning beyond history.

immanence
19 2ibid.

193

Ibid.

of

God operates within

,

p. 44.

,

p. 59; cf. p. 123.

history, but

it is

to

under-

The

the transcendence of

God

which gives history meaning.

Gordon Harland has written,

The

that to "ask the question of the

tory is to ask the question of the

reacted sharply to Niebuhr
that

it is

T

f

meaning

we cannot know

the

McCown

meaning

as
of his-

T

meaning

of history is transcendent,

believes that "the value and meaning of

history are to be sought and found within history. " 195 However,
that

is,

end of history." 194 C. C. McCown has

s belief that the

"beyond history."

must be granted

first point that

if

of history until the end of history,

we agree
we must

also accept the corollary that meaning cannot be found within history because
that would imply that history has not truly "ended. "

sense" may assure us that

McCown

look for a meaning which is beyond

is

The force

of

"common

correct, but Niebuhr's logic asks us to

hi story s relativities, i.e.
T

,

for a transcend-

ent meaning.

We
is

nothing

should not forget that

more

much

of

what we

call

than Niebuhr's sense of paradox.

It is

"absurd" and "irrational"
a paradox that a God can

be both transcendent and immanent, and that history can both end and be re-

deemed.

A

classic example of Niebuhr s use of paradox is the possibility of
T

something which

is

impossible.

The apocalypse

is

a mythical expression of the

impossible possibility under which all human life
stands. The Kingdom of God is always at hand in
the sense that impossibilities are really possible,

and lead

to

new

actualities in given

moments

of

194

Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York,

195

C. C.

McCown,

Review

,

"In History or

38 (July, 1945), 175.

Beyond History,

"

1960), p. 95.

The Harvard Theological
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history.

Nevertheless every actuality of history
reveals itself, after the event, as only an approximation of the ideal; the Kingdom of God is therefore
not here. It is in fact always coming but never
here. 196
Although this passage appears paradoxical
is

one which Niebuhr would accept as true.

Niebuhr has attempted

to

show

that a

of the fall ol

man

way

man.

in

The important
true.

—

the paradox

fact here is that

Historical illusions

For example, the lack

of historical truth

does not destroy the truth contained

"The Christian Conception

which the myth of the

This

not unintelligible

in the

myth

man. 197

In a chapter entitled

the

if

myth can be

do not destroy the truth of the myth.
in the story of the fall of

—

is

fall is

of Sin, "

Niebuhr showed

an adequate expression of the nature of

important because Niebuhr's acceptance of man's sin controlled

the shape of his philosophy of history.

Niebuhr

human

evil.

felt that the

According

responsibility." 198

man's
196

An

myth

to this

E v jj

js

"evil will, " since it

of the Fall effectively explained the nature of

myth, "evil came into the world through human

therefore attributed

—

in prophetic religion

was man who introduced

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

,

p. 60.

p. 60; cf. E. L. Allen, Christianity and Society:
Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (London, n. d.), p. 37.

l98

An

,

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

199ibid.

3

p. 75.

,

p. 71.

to

evil into the world. 199

107
Ibid.

—

A

Guide

to the

It

was not

"the limitations of natural

man"

that resulted in

human

evil, but

rather the free choice of man, which resulted in the initiation of evil.
Fall expressed this because
of his

own

will

caused his

it

made man

the active agent in the

Thus, evil

fall.

myth

The

— man

something inherent in the

is

rather than the result of man's environment -produced limitations.

self,

Man

will

not purge his life of evil by eliminating those instruments by which he imagines

—

evil to originate

ignorance, slums, weaponry.

The more man attempts

to eliminate evil, the

he becomes in absolutizing "partial and

embedded

evil

because

own

history, for he is unable to

it

is

in his

own

finite

self.

overcome

more deeply involved

values."

Man

This is why

cannot eliminate

man

cannot

fulfill his

his inability to perfect his life.

and history must
transcend life and history, since everything
which appears in time and history is too partial and
incomplete to be its center. But man is destined,
both by the imperfection of his knowledge and by his
desire to overcome his finiteness, to make absolute
claims for his partial and finite values. He tries,
200
in short, to make himself God.

The organizing center

By attempting

to

overcome

his

own

himself capable of becoming God.

of life

finiteness and his

fact of

God

20Q Ibid.

,

f

it is

axiomatic that God

201
results in a jealous God.

man

s jealousy due to

"the

evil,

man imagines

At the very least, man's striving toward

perfection is in the image of God, for

attempt by

own

human

The myth

is perfect.

This

of the Fall explains the

rebellion against the divine. "

This

p. 82.

201 For an elaboration of the idea of a "jealous God," see Beyond Tragedy
pp. 27-28.

,

81

interpretation of the Fall, according to Niebuhr, is "a revelation
of a tragic
reality of life, " and "is attested by every page of

Niebuhr has used the myth of the Fall

human nature and human
tion in history, for

its

it

is

history.

to

human history

.

"

202

support his interpretation of

The myth cannot be rationalized

a product of supra-history 203

It is

wrong

/i.e., mythical religion's/ supra-history to actual history."

into a posi-

"to

reduce

For when

this is done

the myth of creation is constructed into an actual
history of origins when it is really a description of
the quality of existence. The myth of the Fall is

made

into

an account of the origin of

evil,

when

it

is really a description of its nature. 204

Thus the myth of the Fall

human

human

is

a "true myth" because

it

accurately describes the

situation.

The

reality of this situation is one in which the importance of inevitable

evil

—

or "original sin"

—

is

emphasized.

The conclusion most abhorrent
is that the possibilities of evil

to the

modern mood

grow with

the possi-

and that human history is therefore
not so much a chronicle of the progressive victory
of good over evil, of cosmos over chaos, as the
story of an ever increasing cosmos, creating ever
increasing possibilities of chaos. 2 °5
bilities of good,

An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics

,

pp. 83-84.

203 C. C. McCown has failed to realize that the Fall represents an "eternal myth"
in Niebuhr's theology, and it can therefore be accepted as "true" at the same
time that evolution is granted. It is true, as McCown writes, that Niebuhr
has introduced a "surd" into his philosophy of history, but that is not harmful
to a philosophy built upon paradox. ("In History or Beyond History, " op. cit.
,

159-160.)

2Q4 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
2Q5 Ibid.
92.
,

p.

,

pp

B

85-86.

The perfect allusion for

dilemma

this

that of Scylla and Charybdis.

be fulfilled by himself.

is

one which Niebuhr has used frequently

The nature

of

man assures

Man, by his energy and wisdom,

that his destiny cannot
is able to

create

much

good, but not without accumulating evil; and he is able to build his cosmos, but
not without threatening its existence with even greater chaos.

The "nature and destiny
nature

—

Biblical

left to a

man" are

thus inevitably connected.

—

He cannot provide

demonstrates that he

his history with

force which is beyond

Man recognizes

incapable of fulfilling his

is

meaning

0

That function must be

man and beyond history.

the possibility for the eternal:

Man

as a creature of both finitude and the eternal
cannot escape his problem simply by disavowing
the ultimate. 2 °6

Man

creature of history, yet he

is a

Man

is unique:

only mortal animal who knows that he is
mortal, a fact which proves that in some sense he is
not mortal. Man is the only creature imbedded in the
is the

flux of finitude

proves that

2Q6 Ibid.

,

Man's

observed through the pages of history, and illustrated through such

myths as the Fall

destiny.

of

p. 68.

207 Ibid., p. 67.

in

—

who knows that this is his fate; which
some sense this is not his fate. u<

83

Niebuhr was willing

to let the

as an expression of truth. 208

paradox expressed

from

It is

in the

this type of

above passage stand

paradox that he developed

his philosophy of history.

_3.

accurate to designate, as does Herbert Muller, paradox to be for

It is

Niebuhr the "essence of history." 208 The element of paradox
philosophy of history

is

Niebuhr

T

s

found in prominent use in his first book in 1927, Does

Need Religion?

Civilization*

in

.

Seven years later Niebuhr began

systematically

to

construct a philosophy of history in several chapters of Reflections on the End
of an Era.

Both here, and

paradox was the Pandora
philosophy of history.

T

s

The

in

An

Interpretation of Christian Ethics in 1935,

Box from which flew
first chapter of

the various arguments of Niebuhr's

Beyond Tragedy was

entitled

Deceivers, Yet True." The paradox contained in this first chapter

haps symbolic of the fact that Beyond Tragedy was Niebuhr
primarily

to

1

s first

"As

title is

per-

book devoted

philosophy of history.

The most virulent attack upon Niebuhr

conception of the "truth" has been
by Holtan P. Odegard, in Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as

made
P olitical Theologian (Yellow

j

s

The following passage
is typical of the tone of Odegard s book: "History has become, in the hands
of Niebuhr, a place or state where man can create progress — and yet where
he cannot, because progress is also dependent upon divine intervention.
History has become a haunt filled with mystery in which human problems
cannot be solved by men. " (p. 64) It greatly bothers Odegard that man should
live in a mystery -filled "haunt."
Springs, Ohio, 1956).
1

^^^Herbei"t J. Muller, The Uses of the Past: Profiles of
(New York, 1952; Mentor Edition) p. 389.
,

Former

Societies

84

N. P. Jacobson no doubt believed that the following comments could
be offered as trenchant criticism of Niebuhr
"reason.

T

s

use of paradox rather than

11

The obscurantism

*

of our author

/Niebuhr/ might
provide a complete study of its own. His love for
paradox can be seen at work elevating absurdities
to some more worthy level. Human reason suffers
in this treatment, and the force of Niebuhr' s entire
work is weakened. For if human reason at once
provides the only means of communicating meaning
and on the other hand cannot be trusted, we are left
Of course, Niebuhr has
no intention of destroying the credibility of reason
any farther than is necessary to discredit opposing
2
views.
in a blind alley, indeed.

*

The whole point of Niebuhr's work
upon reason.

It is

but that is not the

true that

same

is that a

human reason

as saying that

philosophy of history cannot be based

means

is a valid

human reason

of

communication,

is the foundation of

this

argument only

believes that reason, rather than paradox, offers a

more profound

ing.

of

One

human

will feel

Niebuhr

T

s

work weakened by

if

mean-

one

appraisal

history.

Paradox was not the only element
that received early expression.

and Destiny of

Man and
,

A

of his full interpretation of history

careful study of Beyond Tragedy

Faith and History

,

,

The Nature

in conjunction with an examination of

his earlier publications, reveals the fact that before the publication of these later

three works, Niebuhr had

—

Original sin, as

it

history.

210

at the least

—

intimated

formed the basis

for

all of his

man's

major ideas on

inability to independently

N. P. Jacobson, "Niebuhr s Philosophy of History, " The Harvard Theologi cal
Review, 37 (October, 1944), 260.
1

85

provide his history with meaning, was well entrenched in Niebuhr

by the early 1930

T

s.

The supernatural force

in the

form

transcendent God, which provided human history with

its

elaborately defined in Reflections on the End of an Era
of

man

T

Destiny

s history

211
,

inglessness
ent

whether

it

show great concern

to

s

theology

immanent-

meaning, was already

The actual "meaning"

was certainly not explained as adequately as

but Niebuhr did

—

.

of an

T

it

was

Human

in

rescue history from mean-

be the "false meaning" of liberalism or the "transcend-

meaning" of dialectical theology.
Niebuhr s early writing does not offer a systematic statement of his
1

.

philosophy of history, but

it

does contribute

to

thought an awareness of the development which

more well-known

later books.

It is

philosophy of history by studying

our understanding of Niebuhr's

made

possible the writing of the

true that one can gain a sense of Niebuhr s
T

Human

Destiny or Faith and Histor y.

It is

also

true that one would not be fully aware of Niebuhr s philosophy of history by
T

The great synthetic works

merely surveying his early writing.
duces after
the

many years

to

an iceberg only for

to his thought.

know only these masterpieces

is

and forgetting

its

exposed

its

tip,

thought cannot be profoundly understood

if

somewhat

Human Destiny

,

pp. 287-321.

like appreciating

massive base.

one merely skims

ideas and neglects the development which produced them.

211 See

man pro-

spent discovering and refining his own ideas are surely

most accessible avenues
However,

that a

A

man's

off the "finished"

The tangle

of ideas

from which Reinhold Niebuhr
that vision in a

way which

T

s

philosophy of history developed illuminates

the finished philosophy taken alone cannot accomplish.
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